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Countries emerging from socialism must move  McLure suggests an alternative to the
quickly to implement tax systems that will allow  income tax: the simplified alternative tax, a
them to finance the proper functions of govern-  consumption-based direct tax.  The simplified
ment in a noninflationary way.  Yet they are ill-  alternative tax encourages savings and invest-
prepared to cope with the intricacies of a stan-  ment in a way that is economically neutral and
dard income tax.  'They lack the accounting  avoids many of tihe  administrative problems of
practices, the tax administration, and the experi-  an income tax - especially those stemming
cncc with tax compliance to make an income tax  from timing issues and the need to adjust for
work well.  It is imponant to design tax policy  inllation.
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ignoring them during the (possibly long) period  The simplified alternative tax is not a
when they remain significant impediments.  panacea, but McLure suggests that it deserves
serious consideration.
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the choice of a tax system for a country emnerg-
ing from socialism.
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I. INRODUCrION
Countries  in transition  from  socialism-reforming  socialist  economies  (hereafter  RSEs)  face  severe
fiscal  problems. The problem  is not merely  that  most of them  are running  large budget  deficits  that
threaten  to fuel  inflation  and  undermine  transition,  though  this  is, indeed,  a serious  problemY  The  basic
outlines  of their tax systems  were  set during  the period  of classical  central  planning  when  taxes  did not
play  an important  role in either  the allocation  of resources  or the distribution  of income.? Thus at the
beginning  of the  transition  process  the  systems  were-and  some  still  are-otally inappropriate  for a market
economy.- They contained  (or stll contain)  anomalies  that will distort  resource  allocation  and create
inequities  in the distribution  of income  if continued  after transition. Perhaps more important,  the
countries  lack the administrative  infrastructure,  the accounting  practices,  and the experience  with tax
administration  and compliance  needed  to make  a modern  tax system  fiimction.  Thus, as privatization
occurs,  and revenues  can no longer  be taken from captive  state  entrprises, tax collection  is likely  to
become  more difficult  and revenues  are likely  to fallY  Nor can tax administration  and compliance
quicldy  be improved,  though  every  effort  should  be made  to do so.
The general  tendency  has been  to suggest  that the RSEs  adopt  reformed  tax systems  patterned
after  those  found  in the developed  countries  of the West. Thus  there  would  be a value  added  tax similar
to those  used  by members  of the European  Community,  an individual  income  tax, and  a company  income
tax similar  to those  found  in the West. As has so often  been  the case in developing  countries,  too little
thought  has been given (and is being given)  to the features  of RSEs that may make the standard
prescription  less  than  totally  appropriate  for these  countries.y
Individual  income  taxes would  presumably  have graduated  rates, but efforts  to use personal
exemptions,  itemized deductions,  and other devices to  "flme  tune" liabilities to  the  individual
circumstances  of taxpayers  should  be minimized  to prevent  administrative  and  compliance  problems;  this
issue is discussed  further below.  In several 'reformed" systems saving  and investment  is being
encouraged  by a variety  of tax "gimmicks,"  including  investment  credits,  accelerated  depreciation,  and
tax holidays;  these  are reminiscent  of both 1960s  style  interventionism  in Latin  America  and the use of
tax incentives  for similar  purposes  in advanced  countries  before  the worldwide  tax reform  movement  of
the 1980s.9'  There are ample  reasons  to believe  that  this is not  good  policy.
This  paper  was  prepared  under  the  auspices  of the  Socialist  Economies  Reform  Unit  of the  World
Bank.  I gratefiully  acknowledge  comments  made  on an earlier draft by Cheryl  Gray, Janos
Kornai,  Stephen  Langlois,  John  Litwack,  George  Zodrow  (who  taught  me most  of what  I know
about  the SAT),  and especially  Richard  Bird,  and by participants  in a seminar  organized  by the
Fiscal  Affairs  Deparanent  of the International  Monetary  Fund, including  Milka  Casanegra,  Ved
Ghandi,  Leif Muten,  Abdul  Rahman,  Vito  Tanzi,  and  Christine  Wallich.
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The purpose of this paper is to break out of this mindset-to offer a plan for reform of direct
taxation  that is more closely geared to the problems  of the RSEs. It addresses  such concerns  as weak tax
administration  and lack of experience  with mass taxes; the special  twist given to distributional  issues by
both the legacy of socialist indoctrination  and the potentially  egalitarian  eff  of privatization;  and the
desire to attract foreign investors.
The  tax  system  proposed  for  consideration,  a  consumption-based  direct  tax  which  I  call  the
Simplified  Alternative Tax or SAT, has been proposed elsewhere, but has not been adopted by any
country.Y1  To some extent this lack of action on the SAT can be explained by the novelty of the
proposal;  after all, no one wants to be a pioneer in a matter of this importance. I contend, however, that
RSEs should at least consider the SAT, since they are being pioneers in economic matters far more
important  than tax policy.  To some extent failure to adopt  the SAT can be explained  by the legitimate
concerns  that have been raised about  the tax.  I contend  that many of these concerns are less important
in the RSEs  than in other contexts.
Sew;on II outlines some of the objectives  of tax policy in RSEs and some of the constraints  on
the achievement  of those objectives. Section  HI provides examples  of the overwhelming  complexity  of
the income tax.  Section IV explains  the basic mechanics  of the SAT and contrasts the simplicity  of the
SAT with the complexity  of the income tax.  Section  V describes  the economic  advantages  of the SAT
and section VI discusses some potential problems of the SAT.  The final section contains concluding
remarks. Two appendixes  contrast  the SAT with the income  tax and with two forms of VAT.  A third
appendix  explains  briefly several  reasons for preferring  the SAT over another form of direct consumption-
based tax.  As noted in secdon V, the SAT is equivalent  to exemption  of the return to investmnent.  In
present value it is equivalent  to a tax on consumption  under certain circumstances. See McLure gjj.,
(1990) chapter 8.  This last point is not emphasized  in the text, since the important debate in RSEs is
likely to be with advocates  of a traditional income tax.
HI. OBJECTIVES  AND CONSTRAINTS
In many ways the objectives of tax policy for RSEs and the constraints on their realization
resemble those found in middle-income  developing  countries  with market economies. But they are also
different in important  ways. Both the similarities  and the differences must be considered  in framing tax
policy for countries in transition from socialism.  lTis section discusses some of these objectives and
constraints.Q'
A.  The Ecanomic  Context
The tax policy  examined  in this paper is being  offered  as potentially  interesting  to all the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe making  the transition  from socialism, notably Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet  Union, and Yugoslavia. 2'  In several cases (e.g., Czechoslovakia,
the USSR, and Yugoslavia)  it may be the constituent  republics  that would  be interested, if existing  unions
were to dissolve.' 2 The paper discusses the suitability of the SAT for a generic RSE, though using
examples  from particular countries.
1.  The nee  for a sable business  clima.  Ideally the preferred long-run tax policy for an RSE
would be put in place before the beginning  of transition and would  then be basically  unchanged,  in order
to  simplify transition to the new tax system and promote certainty and stability in the investmentclimate.k Of course,  that prescription  is unrealistic,  since  all these  countries  have  already  undertaken
some restructuring  of their economies  and some  have already  made important  changes  in their tax
systems. A more  realistic  picture  would  find  the  tax system  changing-perhaps  repeatedly-as  everything
else changes. Ihis suggests  a less  rigorous  set of guidelines  for tax policy  during  transidon: avoidance
of the "zigzag  problem." By this, I mean  that  RSEs  should  decide  at the outset  the type  of tax system
they  ultimately  want  to have  and then  move  toward  it essentially  in a linear  manner,  avoiding  reversals
of policy  that create uncertainty  for business. An additional  suggestion  is to avoid introducing  an
individual  tax  that  is more  sophisticated  and  complicated  than  can  be administered,  risking  either  massive
non-compliance  or the need  to rescind  the policy  and  adopt  a system  that  is more  appropriate,  given  limi
tations  imposed  by the capacity  for tax administration  and  compliance.
2.  Three tyne of busines.  In all these countries  state enterprises  loom  large in the overall
economy,  and are likely  to continue  to do so for some  time,  due  both  to rel'ctance  in some  countries  to
privatize  completely  and  the difficulty  in all of privatizing  quickly. It thus  seems  best to thini of three
general  types  of business.2  First are the state enterprises. Inidally  these  will be fbund in-or even
dominate-almost  all sectors  of the economy  (with  exceptions  such  as agriculture  in Poland,  which  was
decoflectivized  in 1956). Ultimately-following  extensive  privatization-state  ownership  may be found
primarily  in sectors  characterized  as public  utilities  in the WVest  and in certain  industries  thought  to have
"special  importance,"  such as steel and energy.  In principle,  it should  be relatively  easy for the
authorities  to exercise  fiscal control  over these  enterprises,  providing  appropriate  accounting  standards
are implemented. Indeed, much of the tax revenues  of RSEs has traditionally  come from these
enterprises. Even  so, the history  of soft budget  constraints  and losses  makes  one less than  opdmistic
about  collecting  taxes  from most  such  enterprises.i
The second  group are large  enterprises  that  are primarily  in the private  sector. These  include
both locally  and foreign-owned  fis.  (Whether  to classify  joint ventures  between  public  and private
firms with public  or private  enterprises  is not totally clear.  The answer  probably  depends  on the
breakdown  of ownership,  voting  rights,  etc. Fortunately  this distinction  is probably  not crucial  for the
present  discussion.)  Tne  primary  issues  for this  group  are a) whether  such  firms  have  accoundng  records
adequate  for their fiscal control  and b) whether  they are widely  or closely  owned.  Widely  owned
companies  are likely  to be more  easily  controlled  by fiscal  authorities  than  are closely  held  ones,  because
of their  need  to report  to shareholders.
The  third  group  consists  of the  burgeoning  small  business  sector. Many  "firms"  in this category
are closely  owned  (they  may  be proprietorships.  including  "mom  and pop"  businesses),  many  have  quite
inadequate  books  of account,  many  are not formally  registered  to do business,  some  do not even  have
identifiable  permanent  places  of business,  and  many  will  not  voluntarily  pay  the taxes  they  owe. In  short,
they  are typical  of the "hard-to-tax"  groups  found  in developing  countries.
B.  Administration  and Compic
One legacy of central planning  is the virtually  complete  lack of both a tax administration
infrastructure  and experience  with tax compliance.  Under  classical  central  planning,  (some  if not all)
profits of state enterprises  were simply  transferred  to the state budget  (and investment  funds were
allocated  among  enterprises  by the planners). The transfer  was simply  a bookkeeping  entry  involving
enterprise  "funds' that, due  to the all-inclusive  nature  of planning,  generally  could  not be used for any
other purpose.A  In this "tellering"  activity, as much attention  may have been paid to allocating
revenues  to the appropriate  budgetary  fimds  as to verifying  the accuracy  of reported  profits.W  While4
there might be arguments about  just how great the profits to be transferred were in particular cases, the
basic fact remains that defining  taxable  income carefully  and correctly was not high on anyone's agenda.
Similary, while  the interests  of the  planners  and those of enterprise managers  were not totally congruent,
they were ceitainly more closely akin than are those of the typical taxpayer and fiscal authorities in a
Western market economy.  Tn 4i,ort, tax administration  and  compliance are different in  kind and
importance  under central planning  and in a market economy.
The situation is not much better in RSEs stating  from the less extreme position of market
socialismA  What are commonly  called turnover taxes are not the type of multistage cascading taxes
oa gross receipts that go by that name in the West. Rather, in RSEs  turnover taxes simply represent the
difference  between controlled  retail prices (net  of retail  and wholesale  margins)  and manufacturing  costs.
Again tax administration  and compliance  are less demanding  than in a market economy. Much the same
can be  said for  the profits tax, which irn the pre-Utansition  system was coliected only from  state
enterprises.  The base of the tax is "balance  sheet profits." a concept that bears little resemblance to
economic  ineome. (For present  purposes  the most important  difference  is the failure  to allow  depreciation
allowances and deductions for some interest expense.) More to the point, for neither of these taxes is
any real administrative  effort expended.
The "supply constrained  economy"  that is characteristic  of Communism  creates behavior  that will
be inimical to tax compliance and administration.0' Enterprise managers have learned to barter with
each other in order to circumvent  the restrictions of central planning and obtain the inputs they need.
They will find the skills in barter trade and the personal  ties developed in this process to be valuable in
avoiding  tax liabilites.
Kornai (199(, pp. 118-19)  has identified  yet another legacy of Communist  rule that compounds
the problem of inadequate  tax administration:  disrespect  for the state and its laws.  He notes:
people in general consider it a laudable  act, rather than something  to be ashamed of, if someone
defrauds the state, appropriates  its wealth, or shuns his own obligations. ITose who refrain from
this kind of behavior are seen as dupes....  Consequently,  when we contemplate  budget  revenues
we should be prepared to face the fact that many citizens  will try hard to dodge taxes....  In the
Hungarian  case, there is an additional  factor: a considerable  part of the private sector  still belongs
to the shadow economy, and it will voluntarily  emerge from the shadow  and into the light-only
after some time.
Another legacy of Communism,  based on experience  with the secret  police, is a deep-seated  fear
of the state.  Kornai rightly fears a system in which tax collectors  spy on taxpayers, keeping a constant
check on 0-.ir earnings and expenditures.
Und .r Communism, earning income outside the tightly controlled state enterprise sector was
disreputable, if not illegal.  This mindset  perneates much thinking in the RSEs.  Even now, one hears
complaints against "speculation"--what  economists in the West might call the seeking of unexploited
opportunities for profit that make the economy  innovative  and efficient. Thus many residents of RSEs
will be reluctant to reveal their incomes  to the fiscal authorities, for fear of reprisals.
The upshot of this discussion-and that of the ptevious subsection-is that every effort should be
made both to upgrade tax administration  and compliance  and (especially  in the short run) to design tax
policies with the constraint posed by inadequate  administration  and compliance firmly in mind.  As5
Komai (1990, pp. 120, 117) states the issue, "Hungary needs a tax system able to evade the dilemmas
described above...  .Taxes should be  collected where they are  'seizable,'  giving preference to  the
technically  simplest forms of taxation."  Bird adds (in correspondence  with the author), "it is a classic
'Hard-to-tax' problem from developing  countries,  which presumably  calls for the same sorts of solutions
e.g., withholding  where possible, presumptive  techniques, and a decent auditing and penalty system."
Pending  the development  of improved  taxpayer morale and auditing, it is important  to utilize withholding
to  the extent possible and to  design the  system in  such a  way  as to  facilitate compliance and
administration.
C.  Disibutinal  onsiderati
In virtually all countries there is a desire to use progressive taxation  to "level down" the peaks
in the income  distribution. This egalitarian  sentiment  appears  to be at least as strong in RSEs as in other
societies;  it is almost  certainly  stronger there than in the United  States. Up to now it has been manifested
formally primarily in the compression  of wages; workers in RSEs who would have high incomes in the
West are simply paid less than the value of  their inarginal product, rather than receiving a wage
commensurate  with productivity  which is then subject to high marginal  tax rates.
The essential absence of private entrepreneurial  activity (at least in legal forms) and private
property has, until recently, largely eliminated  the need to think seriously about  progressive taxation of
the income from private business and capital.  Reflecting the socialist bias against private business
activity, the existing  taxes on business income  of individuals  tend to be levied at high rates-rates of 80
to 85 percent-that can only be termed punitive.
The shift to a market economy will change all this.  Wages will be geared more closely to
marginal  productivity. That plus the rise of privaw business  activity and private ownership  of capital will
create tendencies  for inequalities  in the distribution  of income and wealth  not seen in these countries for
many years.1'  TMis,  in turn, will likely lead to pressures for progressive taxation.
On the other hand, the RSEs start from a position of relatively equal distribution of wealth.
Depending  on how privatization  is conducted, the ownership  of shares in companies  may, at least for a
while, be much more widespread and equal than in most Western countries.A' This is particularly
significant  when one thinks about whether  and how to eliminate  the double  taxation  of company  income,
to be considered  further below. Moreover, at least some members of society in RSEs recognize  the need
to offer the incentives  provided by the prospect of large incomes if rapid economic  development  is to
occur.  It is difficult to know how these conflicting  pressures for and against progressive taxation will
ultimately  be resolved.  One would hope, however, that progressivity will be fairly mild and that the
enterprise tax rate and the top marginal rate applied to income of individuals  will be relatively low-in
the range of 40 to 50 percent.
D.  Incentive for-SAying  and-Investment
Following a long period in which private ownership of most forms of capital was out of favor
and in which there was little foreign investment,  RSEs are now interested  in encouraging  domestic  saving
and investment  by both their residents and foreigners. For the most part these countries are adopting
what I call the "Swiss cheese" strategy of legislating tax incentives, tax holidays, and other fiscal
inducements  to saving and investment,  many of them targeted to particular sectors, rather than adopting
a comprehensive  definition  of income for tax purposes and relying on low tax rates and market forces6
to stimulate  saving and investment  and direct funds to the right uses, as many advanced  Western  countries
recently  have done.
This strategy has several undesirable implications. First, it creates opportunities for abuse that
will strain the ability  of weak tax administrations. Obvious  opportunities  for abuse include manipulation
of transfer prices on sales to and from affiliated holiday firms and the 'yo-yo  problem" of residents
sending money out of the country so it can return as tax-preferred foreip  investment.
Sxond, it implies  faith in the ability  of bureaucrats  and politicians  to pick winners and losers that
is unjusdfied  and reminiscent  of central planning, rather than a wilrlngness  to rely on the invisible  hand
of free markets. If the wrong sectors are chosen-or choose themselves,  via abuses-economic  distortions
and the waste of scarce resources will occur.  Third, it  necessitates higher tax  rates than under  a
comprehensive  definition  of  taxable  income.  Finally,  its equity  is  questionable,  and  it  creates  the
impression  of inequity.  In short, it is not an appropriate  policy.  It would be far more appropriate  to
have generalized and neutral incentives  that do not involve picking winners and losers, do not distort
resource allocation, and do not open the door to abuses; ideally such generalized incentives  would be
perceived  to be fair.
E.  11irationl  Considerations
After four or more decades  of isolation  from the West, the RSEs  of Eastern Europe are suddenly
painfully aware of the international  implications  of what they do in the fiscal arena.  First, any of them
with aspirations  of joining the European Community  (EC) are alniost certain to adopt an EC-type value
added tax (VAT).A'  Second, as suggested above, all RSEs are concerned with attracting foreign
investment,  as well as preventing  cap.'al flight. This concern  is reflected  in the desire to have a favorable
tax clime.
Traditionally  it has been thought that tax effects on foreign investment  would be most relevant
for investors from countries employing  a territorial system of taxation or from countries that allow tax
sparing. In the case of countries  utilizing  residence-based  or worldwide  taxation  and offering  foreign tax
credits (without  tax sparing), the source country  tax would  be borne by the treasury  of the home countries
of investors. This view must be qualified  in several respects. First, home-country  tax generally is not
due until profits are repatriated. If investment  is financed  from retained  foreign  earnings, rather than new
equity, there may, in effect, be no additional tax in the home country.WV  Recent changes in the tax
systems of many  countries with residence-based  systems, including  especially  the United States, and the
increasing  prevalence  of excess foreign tax credits that has resulted, make the host-country  tax climate
relevant for many potential investors from such countries.-W  (Tese  changes include reduction in tax
rates, changes  in income allocation  rules, and limits on the foreign tax credit.  This point is explained
further in Section V below.)
m.  COMPLEXITY  OF THE INCOME TAX
In order to understand why the Simplified  Alternative Tax is given that name, Li  is useful to
examine the complexity  that is either inevitable  or likely under the income tax.7
In order  for an income  tax  to be fair and  neutral,  the definition  of income  for tax purposes  must
reflect  real economic  income  fairly  accurately. If this objective  is not realized,  income  from different
sources  will be taxed differently. If this happens,  the tax system  will not be fair and it will distort
economic  decisions.m
Designing  an income  tax that measures  real economic  income  accurately  involves  one major
problem  that  is inevitable,  no matter  what  the rata  of inflation,  and  another  that arises  if prices are not
essentially  stable. These are the issues  of timing  and inflation  adjustment,  respectively.W  Thiing
issues  are discussed  first, Ignoring  issues  of inflation  adjustment. Then the effects  of inflation  are
considered. Finally,  a few  additional  issues  are discussed  briefly.
A.  TimingIaaes
The classic  Haig-Simons  definition  of economic  income  is "consumption  plus  the change  in net
wealth."  Leaving  aside  questions  of  valuing  consumption  and  knowing  exactly  when  consumption  occurs,
we see  immediately  that  the "change  in net wealth"  part  of this  definition  can  be a source  of considerable
trouble,  for it is not necessarily  easy  to know  when  this change  occurs  (when  income  "accrues")  or to
measure  it accurately.  This is perhaps  most  easily  seen  through  the use of several  simple  examples  that
illustrate  the difficulty  of accrual  taxation.
Depreciaton is perhaps the best-known  example  of a timing problem.  Strictly speaking,
depreciation allowances should track the loss in the economic  value of assets  if taxable income is to
reflect  economic  income.zy  Of course,  this pattern  of loss in value  is extremely  difficult  to know, and
arbitrary  schedules  are commonly  used  for  tax purposes  to approximate  actual  depreciation.  The  problem
is that deviations  of depreciation  for tax purposes  from economic  depreciation  will cause  income  to be
mismeasured  and  cause  inequities,  economic  distortions,  or both. Similar  problems  arise  in the case  of
amortization,  depletion,  etc.  In some cases (e.g., advertising  and research and development)  the
problems  are so severe that it is common  to allow  immediate  deduction  of expenditures,  despite  the
inequities  and  distortions  this  creates.
To see the importance  of this  timing  issue,  we can assume  that  the true pattern  of depreciation
of a particular  asset is such  that it loses  99.99 percent  of its value in the second  year, and nothing  in
years  one and three.0  If the relevant  interest  rate used  to discount  tax savings  is 25 percent,  immediate
exr.,nsing  of this  asset (first-year  write-oft)  would  give  a deduction  that  is 25 percent  greater  in present
value  than is appropriate  for the calculation  of economic  income. (If deduction  is to be allowed  in the
first year, an allowance  of only 79.99 would  be required  to equal the 99.99 properly  allowed  in the
second  year.) If, on the other  hand,  the deduction  is postponed  until  the third year, it will be only 80
prcent as great as it should  be.  (A third-year  deduction  of 124.99  would  be required  to be equivalent
in present  value to the allowance  of 99.99 properly  deducted  in the second  year.)  More  generally,  if
deductions  are granted  too rapidly  (too  slowly)  or the recognition  of income  is postponed  (accelerated),
income  for tax purposes  is understated  (,- .rstated).
C4phal  gains should  ideally  be taxed on an accrual  basis, that is, as changes  in asset  values
occur.  This is difficult  for both adnmnistrative  and political  reasons. While it is relatively  easy to
determine  the current  value of securities  that are widely  traded  on financial  markets,  for many  assats
current valuation  is extremely  difficult;  this is true,for example,  of real estate and closely  owned
businesses.  In addition,  the need  to pay  tax on an accrual  basis  could  force  the disposition  of appreciated
assets  and the liquidation  of family  businesses. For these  reasons  capital  gains  are almost  universally
taxed  on a realization  basis, that  is, at the time  of disposition  of assets.Taxation  at realization  creates  other  problems. First, the taxation  of capital  gains  is generally
postponed,  often  for many  years. This  reduces  the present  value  of tax and  undermines  both  horizontal
and vertical  equity.
Second,  taxpayers  can chose  the timing  of realization  of gains  and losses. Thus there is a
tendency  to realize  losses,  but  not  gains. To prevent  abuse,  it is common  to limit  the amount  of capital
losses that can be offset against crdinary  income.  Such limitations create an impedimenw  to risk-taking,
which  requires  unlimited  deduction  of losses.
Third, taxation  at realization  reduces  the mobility  of capital,  as investors  become  locked  into
appreciated  assets.A'
Fourth, if gains are taxed only at realk stion,  they tend to be concentrated in a few years.  Under
a tax system  with  graduated  rates,  the tax liability  on such  gains  will be greater  than  if the gains  were
taxed on an accrual  basis and thus spread out more evenly over more years.  (Of course, the advantage
of deferral  may  far outweigh  the effects  of bunching  of gains.) This problem  caa be ameliorated  by
allowing  the averaging  of income  received  over a period of years, but this adds considerably  to
complexity.
An alternative  approach  is to tax capital  gains  at a preferential  rate; this policy  is also often
proposed  to further  various  other  objectives,  including  stimulus  to saving,  investment,  and risk-taking,
and provision  of ad hoc compensation  fsr inflation. Preferential  treatment  of capital  gains is not a
satisfactory  response  to  any of these concerns,  and it considerably  complicates  compliance  and
administration,  as taxpayers  attempt  to convert  ordinary  income  to capital  gains  and fiscal  authorities
attempt  to prevent  them  from doing  so.
Original  issue  discount  occurs  when  a bond  is issued  at less than  its redemption  value;  (at least
part of) the interest  is implicit  in the increase  in the value  of the bond  as maturity  approaches.  The
question  is when  the increase  in value  occurs. Clearly  it is not appropriate  to assume  that  the increase
occurs  only at the time of maturity  and to tax it then; to do so is to give  this form of income  unduly
favorable  treatment.  On the  other  hand,  assuming  interest  is earned  proportionately  over  the period  from
issae  to maturity  errs in the other  direction;  because  of compounding,  interest  incomo  is earned  later  than
this straight-line  assumption  suggests. Interest  is earned  as indicated  by a table of compound  interest,
and to assume  otherwise  pruduc.ts  an inaccurate  measure  of income.22'  Of course, a similar  problem
exists  anytime  an interest  bearing  security  is not acquired  at its redemption  value-which  is most of the
time,  in tne case  of marketable  securities.
Ma  lti-period production occurs  when expenses are  incurred currently for  the  subsequent
production  )f income.  (Examples  include  long-term  construction  contracts,  mine  development  costs, and
the costs  ox  growing  timber, coffee,  and  orchards.) Such  expenses  should  be capitalized  and deducted
(or depreciated)  at the time income  is earned.m A faster  schedule  of deduction  will be too favorable
to the taxpayer.
This  is only a small  sampling  of timing  issues. A more  complete  list reads  like  a rogues'  gallery
of tax complexity. It would  include installment  sales, decommissioning  of nuclear  power plants,
reclamation  of strip  mines,  capitalization  of the costs  of inventories,  and  the tax  treatment  of property  and
casualty  insurance. The common  features  of many  of these  issues  include  lack  of clarity  as to exactly
when  the change  in net wealth  occurs;  complexity  in accounting  and  in tax  compliance  and  administration,
even  if clarity  is not a problem;  and  distortions  and inequities  if the issues  are not  handled  properly.9
Problems  arise if an income  tax does not provide  symmetry  in the tax treatment  of interest  income
and expense.  That is, under symmetrical  treatnent,  interest would be deductible by the debtor and
taxable to the creditor in the same year.  In fact, many tax systems do not achieve symmetry.  For
example, if taxpayers can choose their fiscal years for tax purposes. it is fairly simple  to "knit together"
repeated  loans between related parties (e.g., a partnership and its partners) in which interest is always
deducted before it is reported as income. This results in a loss of revenue and inequity.
Problems may be  compounded under certain circumstances.  If deductions are sufficiendy
accelerated, if the recognition of income is sufficiently  postponed, or  if the two sides of important
wansauctions  are not treated symmetrically,  some taxpayers may report losses for tax purposes, even if
they are making  money.  If business losses  can be passed  through to the owners of businesses  and used
to offset or 'shelter'  income from other sources, a polidcal  problem  may arise, due to the perception  of
inequity.ul  "Backstop" measures are sometimes used to prevent the unseemly spectacle of wealthy
individuals and large and profitable companies paying no tax.A  These can add enormously to the
complexity  of the system. For example,  the U.S. Tax Reform  Act ef 1986  contains  antishelter  provisions
that-along with efforts to deal with timing issues-help explain why one multinational  accounting  firm
has noted that, "Complexity  is the hallmark  of this legislation.  "2
Timing issues  are inevitable  in any standard  income  tax. Even if the more esoteric  problems  can
be avoided, many mundane ones such as depreciation will remain, and others (multi-year contracts,
installment  sales, etc.) will surface as taxpayers and the economies  in which they operate become more
sophisticated. If they are not handled satisfactorily,  equity and neutrality  will suffer.
B.  I:laio-  AdUa
The tax systems of most developed  countries  were designed  for a world of price stability. That
is, they use historical  costs as the basis for calculating  capital  gains, depreciation  allowances,  and the cost
of  goods sold from inventory.1V Moreover, they make no  distinction between nominal and real
(inflation-adjusted)  interest income and expense. As long as prices are relatively stable, such treatment
is entirely appropriate; inflation  adjustment  is so complicated  that it should not be introduced  unless it
is really needed. If, however, inflation  reaches even relatively  modest levels, it is necessary  to choose
between the complexity  of inflation adjustment  and the inequities and distortions that result from an
unindexed  system.
Several simple exampiles  illustrate  the need for inflation  adjustment. Consider first the issue of
capital gains.  Suppose for simplicity  that the price level has doubled  since an asset was bought.  If an
asset was bought for 100 and now sells for 160, there is no real capital gain; indeed, there has been a
real capital  'oss of 40 (=  160 - 100  x 2).  Yet a tax system  based on historical  values will report a capital
gain of 60 (=  160 - 100) in this case. By comparison,  a system  that provides inflation adjustment  of the
basis of assets produces the correct result.
A similar  problem arises in the case of unindexed  depreciation  allowances  and inventories. If the
price level has increased significantly  since a depreciable  asset was acquired, it would be appropriate  to
base depreciation  deductions  on this increased  value.  Use of historical  value understates  the loss in real
value and overstates  taxable income. Depreciation  allowances  are sometimes  accelerated  in an effort to
offset the effects of inflation.  Of course, a given  pattern of acceleration  is appropriate  for at most one
inflation  rate.10
lie  cost of goods  sold from inventories  can also be indexed  to reflect the increase in their value
since the time of acquisition.  Some countries allow the use of  last-in, first-out (LIFO) inventory
accounting  as a substitute  for explicit inflation  adjustment  of inventories. Note, however, that while this
approach  may appear to be easy to implement,  it is not conceptually  correct, in that it confounds  changes
in re.ative prices of inventories and changes  in price levels (the proper object of indexation).
Consider finally the deduction  of nominal interest expense and the taxation of nominal interest
income.  Suppose the real interest rate is 5 percent, the inflation  rate is 20 percent, and the nominal
interest rate is 25 percent.w  It would be appropriate  to  allow  a deduction for (and tax) only the real
interest payment of 5 percent, because the part of nominal interest rates that exceeds the real rate
represent compensation  for loss in the value of principle,  not interest, per se.  The conceptually  correct
way to achieve this result is to disallow a deduction  for (exclude an amount of income equal to) the
inflation  rate times the principal amount  of indebtedness. An alternative  that may be somewhat  simpler,
but is correct only under very special circumstances,  is to disallow (exclude) a pezcentage  of interest
equal to the fraction of the nominal interest rate represented by the inflation rate.AV In this simple
example both techniques give the same result: disallowance (exclusion) of  80 percent of  interest
deductions  (income).  It is apparent from this example  that adjustment  for an unexpected  inflation  rate
as low as 20 percent can have major impacts  on &e equity  of the tax system.  (If inflation  is expected,
there is likely to be little effect on either equity or resiource  allocation  in a closed economy; distortion  of
resource allocation is likely to be serious only if borrowers and lenders are subject to substantially
different marginal  tax rates.  In an open economy  resource  allocation may also be seriously affected  by
expected  inflation. See also McLure La., 1990, chapter 7.)
These examples illustrate the need for inflation  adjustment,  as well as suggesting one form of
adjustment,  ad hoc and essentially  independent  adjustments  of each of the four affected  types of income
flows (capital  gains, depreciation, inventories,  and interest). An alternative "integrated"  approach  used
in Chile that is more accurate makes  adjustments  to non-monetary  elements  of the balance  sheet and then
reflects these adjustnents in the income statement.w 1 The adjustment  of interest is an implicit result
of the process, rather than being done explicitly.
Whichever  of these approaches  is used, the ad hoc approach or the integrated  Chilean approach,
there can be no doubt that inflation adjustment  is complicated. It would be a major burden for any
country, and doubly so for  a  country with only rudimentary accounting practices, almost no tax
administration,  and almost no experience  with taxpa.yer  compliance. The problem is aggravated  by the
lack of reliable price indices.9'  Inflation adjustment  is not something  the RSEs should gladly or lighty
undertake.
Whether inflation  adjustment  is needed in RSEs is not clear.  The historical experience  of these
countries  provides no guidance,  as it reveals only the artificial  price stability  of suppressed  inflation. The
transition experience  of the pioneer RSEs would  be of some relevance, if it were thought that tax policy
in other countries could be fundamentally  reformed before  the beginning  of transition. In Poland prices
rose by 78 percent in January 1990, immediately  following  the administration of "shock treatment;"
although inflation  has slowed markedly, it has been perhaps 5 percent per month since then,-9 a rate
that, if continued,  would clearly  justify concern about  the effects  of inflation  on an unindexed  tax system.
Whether this experience is relevant depends on whether a given country ean manage transition without
inflation,  and if not, whether it will have  undergone  much  of the transition mcst likely to induce inflation
before tax reform can be completed, and thus avoid the need for inflation  adjustmentThe most relevant question is the rate of inflation that will prevail in the years imediately
following  tax reform. There is little on which to base an estimate  of this rate, but my guess is that it may
be fairly high for several years following  the beginning  of transition  and tax reform-perhaps in the range
of 10 to 20 percent per year.  If this is true, reliance on an unindexed  tax system would be risky.
C.  Is
The above discussion  should suggest  why I have given  the following  assessment  of the U.S. Tax
Reform of 1986, which addressed rizany  timing issues, but did not provide for inflation  adjustment:
it is horribly complex-so much so that we may have shown definitively that attempting to
implement a  conceptually correct  income tax  (even one  without inflation adjustment) is
impractical.A
Problems that would be encountered  by an RSE go beyond those identified  thus far.
1.  i  £.  Under so-called classical  systems the equity income of companies  that is
distributed to shareholders  as dividends  is subject to double taxation. That is, corporate tax i* paid on
the income and then individual  tax is paid on the dividends. In such systems there are strong incentives
to prefer debt to equity finance and to recharacterize  dividends  as interest, since the interest is deductible
and dividends are notA 5 Depending  on the relationship  between company  tax rates and individual  tax
rates applied to dividends and capital gains, there may be an incentive  to avoid use of the corporate
form.
Most European countries allow relief from double taxation  of dividends, commonly  through the
imputation  (shareholder  credit) method. That is, the corporate tax attributable  to income distributed as
dividends  is treated as a withholding  tax for which shareholders  receive a tax credit.  Even so, most do
not allow complete  dividend relief.  Moreover, to the extent that dividend relief is granted in the first
instance to the shareholder, rather than to the company paying dividends, there is likely to be some
residual preference for debt finance, even where dividend relief is complete.  This is true because
business  managers  may respond more strongly to corporate deductions-for either interest or dividends-
than to shareholder  credits.  Only to the extent that dividends  and interest  are treated identically  (taxable
to  the recipient and deductible to the payor) is there likely to  be no such preferenceA.-  (Germany
combines a shareholder  credit with application  of a lower rate to income  that is distributed;  presumably
the latter feature has the same effect as an equivalent  deduction for dividends  paid.)
The dividend-paid  deduction  appears  to be simpler  to implement  than  the shareholder  credit, since
it lodges the primnary compliance  problems at the enterprise level.  In fact, this difference is easily
overstated.  If there is withholding of tax on dividends, the two are essentially equivalent from an
administrative  point of view.
The existence of deviations of taxable income from economic  income further complicates  the
problem of providing dividend relief.  In order to prevent giving relief for company  taxes not actually
paid, most countries have special provisions  (e.g. the Advance  Corporation  Tax in the United  Kingdom
and the precompte in France) intended to  limit relief to the amount of company taxes paid.  Such
provisions  are inevitably complicated,  and they can distort decision-making.-'
inter-corporate (or inter-company)  dividends create a final source of complexity. That is, it is
necessary  to prevent multiple  taxation  of such income, without  granting  overly generous  treatment. This12
can be especially  Important  in RSEs, where holding  companies  are likely to be established  in the process
of privatization, intercompany  holdings are likely to be quite common, and there are likely to be many
joint ventures.
In short, prevention  of double  taxation  of dividends  is complicated. Again, while  necessary from
an economic  point of view, it is not something  RSEs will soon be prepared to handle.
2.  (lgh  a-  . Most authorities  on taxation would probably agree that global taxation
(taxation  of all income under one rate schedule applied to aggregate income) is conceptually  preferable
to schedular taxation (taxation  of specific  types of income under separate schedules). UJnder  the former
approach, liability is based on the taxpayer's aggregate  income  from all sources, whereas  under the lattr
different rates are applied to different types of income. At first glance global taxation  seems preferable
on grounds of both equity and neutrality.  In fact, schedular taxation has some appeal under certain
circumstances.  We have already seen one example, the avoidance of tax shelters (the offsetting of
artificial tax losses against income from other sources). The second, the simplification  of withholding,
may be especially  imporant in RSEs, since it may reduce drastically  the number  of taxpayers who must
file returns.
3.  Withholdine on interetand  dividends. The taxation of interest and dividends under the
income  tax causes at least two types of complications  related  to withholding. First, recipients  of interest
and dividends are notorious for their reluctance to  report such income and pay tax on  it.  Tlus
withholding on such income, or at least the filing of information returns,  is necessary to prevent  evasion.
Second, in a system with graduated  rates, the marginal  tax rate that should  be applied to interest
and dividends  depends  on the taxpayer's labor income. Thus it is difficult, within  the context of a global
income  tax, to make withholding  a final tax on such income. Recipients  of large amounts  of interest and
dividend income may need to file returns, even though they would not need to do so in the absence of
the progressive taxation  of these income  flows. By comparison,  if schedular  taxes are applied to interest
and divdiends (or if they are tax-exempt),  withholding  is simplified.
Where deduction is allowed for interest payments  of individuals,  including especially  mortgage
interest, further problems arise. Even  the marginal  tax rate to be applied to labor income  depends on the
amount of such deductions.
IV.  MECHANICS  AND SIMPLICITY  OF THE SAT
In many  respects  the Simplified  Alternative  Tax resembles  the type of income  taxes found in most
countries. Yet it differs in important  ways  that have both administrative  and economic  implications. Ihis
section de;; ribes the basic mechanics and simplification  benefits of the SAT.A  Three appendices
compare thn tax to the income tax and two types of VAT and explain why it is simpler than another
consumption-based  direct tax.
A.  Mchanics
The SAT system would consist of two more or less separate taxes.  One would be imposed  on
the wage and salary income (including  pensions) received by individuals;  the other on the income of
businesses.  Both  interest and dividends would be exempt from  both taxes and neither would be
deductible.  Borrowing and lending would have no tax implications.4'  Unlike the situation under the
so-called expenditure  tax.  Capital gains on financial assets would be exempt.  Gains on non-financial13
assets  would  be exempt  from the individual  tax, but would  be subject  to the business  tax.-V Under
some  proposals,  gifts  and inheritances  would  be included  in the base of the individual  tax.
The individual tax could (but need not) accommodate joint returns, perional  exemptions, itemized
deductions,  and graduated  rates; it would be collected  largely through withholding  at source by
employers.  There is much  to be said  for a relatively  simple  system  with  individual  filing,  no personal
exemptions,  and  no itemized  deductions,  at least  until  the  administrative  infrastructure  needed  to deal  with
such  complexities  has time  to develop.  Such  a system  allows  fairly  accurate  withholding  on labor  income
and avoids  the need  for most taxpayers,  especially  those  with  only one employer,  to file tax returns.a
Fortunately,  most  of the RSEs  are not hampered  by a tradition  of joint filing  and  itemized  deductions.
The business  tax would  be levied  at a flat rate-presumably  the top rate  applied  to the income  of
individuals-with  no allowances  for personal  exemptions  or itemized  deductions.  It would  apply  to all
forms of  business, whether state-owned  enterprises,  cooperatives,  collectives,  stock companies,
partnerships,  joint ventures, or  proprietorships. Immediate  expensing  would be allowed for all
investments,  including  those  in depreciable  assets  and  inventories.  Owners  of small  businesses  (including
cooperatives  and corporations)  would  be allowed  to pay salaries  to themselves,  thereby  achieving  the
benefits  of "do-it-yourself  integration."  On  the other  hand,  business  losses  could  not be passed hough
to individual  owners  of the business.A
Owner-occupied  housing  poses  particularly  thorny  questions.  It would  be possible,  in theory,  to
treat  owner-occupied  housing  as a business. This would  necessitate  the imputation  of rental  income;  it
is generally  not recommended.  Instead,  most authorities  agree  that owner-occupied  housing  should  be
treated  in the same  way as financial  investment.  That is, the purchase  and  sale of a home  would  have
no tax implications;  of course,  home  mortgage  interest  would  not be deductible.1L'
B.  Simplicity.o1he  SAT
The SAT  avoids  the  problems  of timing  and  inflation  adjustment  that  characterize  the income  tax,
since interest  payments  have no tax consequences  and business  tax liabilities  are based  on cash flow,
rather than accrual concepts.  For example, expensing  replaces  both depreciation  and inventory
accounting;  thus there is no need (for tax purposes)  to  determine  depreciation  rates or engage in
depreciation  or inventory  accounting  and no need  for inflation  adjustment  of depreciation  allowances  or
inventories.9 (Of course, such issues  may be addressed  in financial  accounting. This is discussed
below.)
Because  of expensing,  the basis  of capital  assets  is identically  zero. Thus the entire  proceeds
from  the sale  of such  assets  is subject  to tax.  There  is no need  to keep  track  of the (depreciated)  basis
of such assets  or to index  it for inflation. This feature  also facilitates  cross-checking  the income  tax
reurns of buyers  and  sellers. Deductions  for the  purchase  of assets  and  inventories  are contemporaneous
with  the reporting  of receipts,  instead  of being  spread  over  time,  as in the  case  of depreciation  allowances
and deductions  for cost of goods sold.5'  (in a growing economy,  expensing  also increases  the
prevalence  of losses;  this issue  is discussed  in section  VI.)
Since  interest  is exempt  and  non-deductible,  such  timing  problems  as original  issue  discount  and
inflation adjusunent  of  interest payments'  cannot arise.  With interest payments  having no  tax
consequences,  postponement  of the recognition  of income  and the acceleration  of deductions  cannot
undermine  the neutrality  or fairness  of the system.14
The SAT avoids the problems *.:eated  by the differential treatment of debt and equity under
virtually all extant income taxes.  First, since both interest and dividends  are treated identically  for tax
purposes (non-deductible  and non-taxable),  there is no artificial tax-induced  preference for one over the
other.  Second, this result is achieved  automatically  under the SAT, without  complicated  provisions for
integrating  the company and individual  taxes.-  Finally, since there is no incentive to recharacterize
dividends  as interest, the administrative  burden of preventing  this abuse is aroided.
The problems related to withholding  identified  earlier are avoided under the SAT.  There is no
need for either withholding on interest and dividends or information  returns covering such income.
Perhaps more imporant,  liability for the individual  tax depends only on labor income (and family
circumstances,  as indicated  by a working spouse, personal  exemptions,  and itemized  deductions);  it dies
not depend  on the amount of non-labor  income received.  Thus withholding  can much more accurately
reflect  final tax liability  than under a global income  tax. This minimizes  the number  of individual  retuns
that must be filed.
The general disallowance  of interest  deductions  would  also increase  the accuracy  of withholding.
It may also facilitate avoidance of one of the most inequitable  and distortionary elements of the tax
systems of some countries, the deduction  of interest on home mortgages.'
The schedular  nature of the SAT implies that tax shelters  based on pass-through  of losses cannot
exist; sheltering can occur only within the boundaries  of a single business filing one tax return.  This
benefit is, of course, bought at the expense of implicitly  taxing all business income (except  that paid out
to the owners as wages) at the business  tax rate, rather than at the marginal  rate applied to other income
of the owners.
It is important not to claim too much for the SAT.57' The individual  portion of the SAT is
essentially  the same as the taxation of labor income under a standard income tax; it involves no major
simplification,  at least relative  to a sensible  income  tax. Perhaps  the most important  difference-aside for
the exemption  of interest and dividends-is that home mortgage interest is inherently non-deductible  in
the SAT framework,  whereas the desirability  of deductibility  is more debatable  in the income  tax context.
The SAT facilitates  compliance  for (and administration  of the tax on) honest taxpayers who want
to pay the proper amount of taxes, but have difficulty in doing so, because of complexity.  It will do
relatively little directly to curb certain abusive practices or to facilitate taxation of the "hard-to-tax"
groups.W In this area there is no substitute for proper administrative  procedures and diligent effort.
But the SAT will help indirectly by freeing administrative-resources  that would otherwise go  into
implementation  of complex provisions.
V.  ECONOMIC  EFFECTS OF THE SAT
The SAT is, under certain conditions,  equivalent  to a tax only on income from labor; that is, to
a tax that exempts the return to investment. This is most clear in the case of interest and dividends,
which are explicitly  exempt from the individual  tax.2 2'
A.  Exe0mDtion  of the Retur to Inve-sted  Capital A.  _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.
What is less clear is that income from other investments  is also, in effect, tax exempt.A  This
can be seen from a simple example. Consider the case of an equity-financed  investment  of $1,000 that
yields $200  or 20 percent one year later.  If the company  tax rate is 30 percent, the company  only invests15
$700 of its own money,  since  the deduction  of $1,000  results  in a tax saving  of $300 (assuming  hie
company  can filly utilize  the deduction  of $1,000  resulting  from expensing  of the investment,  an issue
to be addressed  in the next  section). Tax of $360  must be paid  on "taxable  income"  of $1,200  in the
second  year, leaving  net after-tax  income  of $140 ($1,200-$700-$360).  or 20 percent of the inial
invesunent  of $700 of own company  funds.4'  Since  the net rate of retr  on company  fiuds is the
same  as in the absence  of tax, the marginal  effective  tax rate  (METR)  is zero.
Economists  commonly  cite  the implicit  exemption  of the return  to saving  as one of the primary
advantages  of consumption-based  taxes  such  as the SAT. My  own  view  is that  while  this is an important
advantage,  the administrative  advantages  described  above  are even  more important.
B.  Taxation  of Extraona  Returns
Even  though  the SAT  essentially  exempts  the return  from capital,  it allows  the state  to share  in
extraordinary  returns  to investments.  In the above  example,  the government  also  earns  20 percent  on its
investment  of $300  in forgone  tax revenues;  this is  true even  if the competitive  return  is only 10  percent.
In a sense  the fisc is a silent  partner  in all investments.
This feature could be very important  in economies  in transition from socialism, where
extraordinary  returns  are likely  to be common.  To see  this, consider  these  cases:  the profits  attributable
to trademarks  such  as Coca  Cola  and McDonald's;  the profits  that will  be made  if state  enterprises  are
privatized  on terms that are too generous  to private  investors;  the profits that will be made when
inefficient  but  viable  state  enterprises  become  efficient;  and the returns  from the exploitation  of natural
resources.
C.  I_  =1
As indicated  above,  the return  to investment  is effectively  exempt  under  the SAT. This should
be a powerfil incentive  for saving and investment-and  one that avoids the problems  of targeted
incentives:  the need to pick winners  and losers,  the risk of economic  distortions,  the complexity,  the
opportunities  for abuse,  and  the real  and perceived  inequities.
It is interesting  to compare  risk-taking  under  the  SAT  and  under  a generalized  system  of  perpetual
tax holidays.A'  Under  both the marginal  effective  tax rate is zero.  But, as just noted, under  the SAT
the government  is a partner  in all investments;  thus  it shares  in the cost  of investment  (via  expensing)  and
in all retums,  be they extraordinary  returns,  normal  returns,  low  returns,  or losses. (Mhe  fill validity
of this statement  depends  on the treatment  of losses,  an issue  to be addressed  in the next  section.) By
comparison,  in the case  of holidays  the government  is not a partner,  since  it does not share in the cost
of investment  or in either  gains  or losses. (ibis is actually  an optimistic  assessment.  It is fairly  common
for govermnents  to allow, if not always  intentionally,  deductions  to be taken  for at least  some  expenses
of holiday  firms.  This means  that  losses  are subsidized  and that the METR  on profitable  activities  is
negative.)
This has several  important  implications.  First, under  an income  tax regime  with tax holidays,
if the government  wants  to share  in the returns  to extraordinarily  profitable  investments  it must identify
the opportunities  for such  investments  and  explicitly  make  the investments,  through  state enterprises  or
joint  ventures. This  does  not  appear  to be consistent  with  the sentiments  for  privatization  running  through
the RSEs.-16
Alternatively,  the government  caa abrogate  the laws providing tax holidays, once it sees which
sectors are unusually  profitable. Ordinarily  this possibility  might be dismissed  simply  by noting  the folly
of such a policy for a country that needs to establish a favorable investment  climate in order to attract
foreign investment. But some of the RSEs are already becoming  aware that their holiday provisions  are
much too generous and may therefore  be thinking of rescinding  them.
Second, the up-front  revenue  cost of the SAT  is higher than  that of tax holidays.  Third,  the
stimulus to risk-taking is greater under the SAT than under holidays if gains and losses are treated
symmetrically  under the SAT; see also the discussion  of losses below.
Fourth, it may be more convenient  to tax some employee  fringe benefits by denying business
deductions  for them than to attribute them to employees  and subject them to tax as labor income under
the individual  tax.  This option does not exist under holidays.
D.  Party of stat  nd Drivate  C  enerss
It is important  to achieve  parity in the tax treatment of state enterprises  and private firms during
the period before privatization  is complete.iA  Interest and dividends  received by the state are inherently
tax-exempt.  Thus interest and dividends received by private investors should also be exempt.  This
implies non-deductibility  of interest and dividends  at the enterprise level.  (Otherwise, the METR will
be highly  negative,  considering  the taxes levied at both the enterprise  and shareholder/bondholder  levels.)
In combinatio. this suggests that the SAT is needed to achieve  parity.
E.  Eait  of taxable and tax-exempt  s
One problem found in many Western  countries is the lack of parity between taxable  and exempt
sectors.  Interest and dividends received by non-profit organizations  are commonly exempt.  Besides
being non-neutral,  this treatnent opens the door for various forms of abuse.  The SAT helps to achieve
parity in these and similar situations. Because  all interest would be exempt, that received  by non-profit
organizations  would enjoy no special privilege.
In some countries, business  income  of non-profit  organizations  that is not directly related  to their
charitable purpose is subject to taxation.  (For example, in the United States, income from "unrelated
business  activities"  is taxed.) This seems entirely  appropriate, if only to prevent unfair competition  with
the for-profit sector.  Even if business income of non-profit organizations were to be exempt, the
violation of parity would be less under the SAT (which effectively exempts the marginal reurn  to
investment)  than under the income  tax.
So.  -e countries make the mistake  of exempting  the interest paid on the debt of governmental  and
quasi-gover,imental  agencies.  In the United States, for example, interest on the debt of state and local
governments is exempt from federal taxation (and generally from the state income tax of the state in
question). In many countries interest on all government  debt is exempt.
This is an extremely inequitable and inefficient means of subsidizing  the borrowing of such
entities, since the revenue cost of such exemptions  depends on the marginal tax rates that would have
been paid by high-income  lenders, but the savings in interest costs depend on the marginal  rate paid by
the marginal lender.  By exempting all interest income, the SAT would eliminate the differential
advantage  of public borrowing and the inequity  and inefficiency  it entails.17
VI.  POTENTIAL  PROBLEM  AREAS
When offered in market economies, proposals for the SAT have run into predictable and
potentially  vslid objections. For the most part these objections  appear to be somewhat  less telling in the
context of countries in transition from socialism.
A.  D  o
The SAT effectively excludes  the return to capital from the tax base.  ITis can be appraised in
two ways.  First, the SAT is less progressive than is an income ,ax levied at the same rates.  This is
troublesome  in the developed countries  of the West-and even more so in LDCs-because the ownership
of capital is highly concentrated.9'  This might be less important in RSIEs  than in market economies,
despite  the greater weight  given to distributional  considerations  in the former, if the ownership  of capital
following  privatization  were much less concentrated  than in the West.`'  The degree of concentration
will depend on exactly how privatization  is achieved, that is, via vouchers distributed equally to  all
citizens, distribution of enterprise shares only to workers and managers of the enterprise,  sale of assets,
or "spontaneous  privatization"  (in which enterprise  managers  "take  the enterprise  private," often by means
of questionable  legality).
Second, a society that has been raised to believe that profits and other returns to capital are not
to be tolerated may have considerable  difficulty in swallowing  the notion that income from capital is
effectively to be exempt.  This political problem may initially be ameliorated  by the fact that profit
appears  to be taxed under the SAT, even if interest  and dividends  are not.  Eventually-and perhaps very
soon-it  would become apparent that many who have large econoniic incomes  were paying little or no
taxes.9'
nis  problem of inequity-and the perception  of inequity-would be especially important in the
case of banks and other financial institutions. Because  interest income is exempt and  interest expense
is non-deductible,  the entire profit margin earned from financial  intermediation  would be tax exempt, as
is the income earned from providing  services  of intermediation  (which is commonly  included in exempt
interest income). It has been proposed that a special tax might be imposed  on this sector.@ 9
Third, there is the important issue of whether it is appropriate to define equity in terms of
"opportunities,"  instead  of in terms of "outcomes." Under the income  tax (and under an alternative  form
of consumption-based  tax called the tax on consumed income), those who "strike it rich" on their
investments pay high taxes (except to the extent earnings are reinvested, in the case of the tax on
consumed  income), whereas under the SAT all returns to investment  are exempt.3'
B.  L
Another  of the potentially  troubling  p;oblems  of the SAT is that, because  of expensing,  tax losses
would occur more frequently than under a standard  income  tax.  New companies  are especially  likely to
incur tax losses.  Simple carry forward of losses (without interest) is not a totally satisfactory  solution,
for if deductions  for investments  cannot  be utilized  immediately,  the economic  benefits  of the SAT would
not be fully realized, and some of the simplicity benefits would also be lost.  Moreover, there is the
potential problem that the firm may never have the income necessary to absorb the losses, which are
based on expensing, and not on depreciation allowances.  This is especially true of rapidly growing
firms.21' This prospect can be expected  to dampen the theoretical incentives  for investment  and risk-
taking provided by the SAT? 2'18
Tbe economic benefits of the SAT could be retained if refunds equal to the product of the tax rate
and the amount of losses were paid currently.'  Such refunds are commonly opposed,  due to the risk
of fraud and the administrative  burden of preventing abuse.  While  refunds of d.is  type are paid under
the VAT employed  in the EC,  s  well as the  VATs of many other  countries,  some countries  will not
make large refiunds, especiallo to new firms, without furst  verifying their validity.  An additional problem
is the appearance of unfairness that occurs when profitable companies and wealthy individuals (operating
businesses as companies) receive tax refinds.W
An alternative is to allow tax losses to be carried forward with interest.  While clearly superior
to carry forward  without  interest, this adds somewhat to complexity and does not address the problem
of perpetual tax losses.
It is important to place this problem  in perspective.  Targeted  investment incentives under  an
income tax are likely to create similar problems of unused tax benefits.  Even tax holidays can create
complexity, whether or not firms are allowed to postpone deductions that are worthless during the holiday
period until after the holiday has expired.  Moreover, holidays create opportunities for abuse not found
in the SAT.
C.  Investment Hungor
Kornai has emphasized the insatiable hunger for investment on the part of state enterprises  that
face a soft budget  constraint.7  Some countries with socialist economies  impose taxes  on  investment
spending in the attempt to suppress this investment hunger.  Some may fear that immediate expensing
of capital goods under the SAT would aggravate the excessive demand for investment.
This concern can be addressed on several levels.  First,  including gimmicks in the tax system is
no substitute for a  rational system of ownership, control, and incentives for management to be concerned
abcut profitability.  Where private firms are concerned, there is little reason to expect expensing to lead
to  irrational demands for  investment,  as long as the tax rate is moderate  and there  is no expectation of
state  bail-outs  for  those  who  lose  money.  The  situation  is  more  worrisome  in  the  case  of  state
enterprises,  which historical  experience has given reasons  for such expectations.  This emphasizes the
need for privatization to occur as rapidly as practicable and for managerial  incentives to be rationalized
where  rapid privatization  is not possible.
Beyond that, there  is little reason to fear that expensing under the SAT would provide a unique
spur to investment hunger,  if the alternative is investment incentives, tax holidays,  etc. or an income tax
with  negative  METR  for  debt-financed  investment under  inflationary  conditions.  Presumably  these
policies would have similar effects if their benefits were equally available.
D.  The Cost of Debt capital
The  inability  to  deduct  interest  might  make  foreign-source  debt  capital  too  expensive  for
enterprises operating in an RSE  employing the SAT.  This might necessitate the allowance of deductions
for  interest  (and  presumably  for  dividends,  in  order  to  maintain  parity  between  the  two  types  of
financing).  This, in turn,  would call for taxation of interest received by residents (collected in large part
through  withholding) and perhaps withholding taxes on interest paid to foreigners."'
Such a  compromise  has several  disadvantages.  First,  it would  destroy  the parity  in the  tax
treatment of enterprises owned by the state and those owned privately and the parity of the for-profit  and19
non-profit sectors . Second, it would Increase  the prevalence  of tax losses and tke problems associated
with them.  Third, it would reintroduce  some of the complexities  of the income tax (those related to
timing of the recognition  of interest income and the deduction of interest expense) and (unless interest
deductions  were indexed, at the cost of further complexity) render the tax vulnerable  to the effects of
inflation.
E.  CiE
One potentially  important  characteristic  of taxation-though one that is not currently in vogue-is
automatic or built-in macro-economic  stabilization. Thus tax liabilities would ideally increass during
cyclical periods of prosperity (full employment  and the threat of inflation)  and fall during periods of
cyclical wealmess.
On this criterion the business  portion of the SAT fares rather poorly, compared  to a convenional
income tax.  (The individual  portion of the SAT would resemble the portion of the income tax applied
to labor income  in this respect.) An investment  boom would  reduce tax liabilides  under the SAT because
of the effect of expensing. Conversely,  tax deductions  would fall with a drop in investment  spending.
By comparison, deductions for depreciation allowances under an income tax remain relatively stable,
being determined largely by prior events, rather than current investment.
At  is difficult to know how much weight to  accord the lack of automatic stabilization.  The
traditional Keynesian  view is that built-in stability is very important; extreme monetarist  and radonal
expectations  views would discount  this feature heavily.
F. 
Countries  in transition  from socialism  commonly  lack the generally  accepted  accounting  practices
(GAAP)  found in the West. This hampers  the development  and implementation  of a modern  income tax,
as well as the development  of business more generally. In addition, many small businesses  are likely to
lack the ability to implement  sophisticated  accounting  sysnms.
To some extent the SAT sidesteps  both problems by providing  cash-flow tax treatment of many
receipts and expenditures, including investment in  depreciable assets and purchase of  inventories.
Moreover, neither borrowing and lending  nor payment and receipt  of interest has any tax consequences
under the SAT.  This simplification  advantage  is (or will be) partially offset by the fact that as GAAP
develops firms will need to keep dual records, one set based on GAAP and one based on the SAT
conventions. By comparison,  choosing  the income  tax model should encourage  more rapid development
of GAAP.  (There is some risk that those responsible  for the developmens  of GAAP would seize on the
SAT rules for financial accounting. Any such tendency should be resisted, since these rules are not
appropriate  for judging the financial  performance  of enterprises.)
This problem is easily overstated,  because the tax returns under the SAT would be fairly simple
and would be based on much of the same information  as income  tax returns, but without  the complexities
inherent in compliance  with a satisfactory  income tax law-one that handles timing issues and inflation
adjustment  adequately. Perhaps more important,  any difficulties  of this type are dwarfed by the more
common problem found in the United States, some other Westem countries, and many LDCs: ad hoc
divergence  between  GAAP  and the calculation  of income  for tax purposes. Such  divergence  can be traced
to failure to adopt GAAP for tax purposes in such areas as  installment  sales, inventory  accounting, etc.
and to incentives  such as tax holidays  and accelerated  depreciation. As noted earlier, the SAT eliminates20
the first set of issues and makes targeted incentives  redundant and unnecessary. On balance, this does
not appear to be a matter of major concern.
G.  M  plati  Qnofranacis'
Under the SAT some economically  similar transactions  would be treated very differently.  For
example, lease payments would  be deductible  and taxable, whereas interest wou!d  be non-deductible  and
non-taxable. This opens the way for manipulation  of transactions  between two persons, one of whom
is taxable  under the business  tax and the other of whom is not.  (There is generally  no advantage  to such
manipulation  when both parties are either taxable  ea non-taxable  under the business tax.)  For example,
a taxpayer might simultaneously  lease a building  to a tax-exempt  organization  at below-market  rent and
borrow from the organization at a below-market rate of interest.  Alternatively, it might make an
installment  sale to such an organization-or to an individual-at an understated  price and an overstated  rate
of interest.
Solutions  to this problem might involve floors and ceilings on interest rates and/or the taxation
of certain  business  activities  of tax-exempt  organizations. Though  this problem  deserves further scrutiny,
it does not appear to be important.  A related and potentially  more important  source of problems is
the overstatement  of the purchase  price of imported  assets.  (It would generally  do no good to inflate  the
price of assets produced  locally, for reasons indicated  above.) Since  assets can be written off in the first
year, there may be an incentive  to overstate  their value.  If substantial  customs  duties are applied to such
imports, this abuse is unlikely; in some countries,  however, such imports  are duty free or subject to low
tariffs.  Of course, one hopes that the RSEs  will employ  only low and uniform  tariffs. The VAT would
not have much effect in preventing  this practice, since it is creditable  against future liabilities. It should
be noted that similar abuse is possible, though in attenuated  form, under a conventional  income tax.
H.  Ismatin
I  is unclear whether  the United States would  allow foreign tax credits for the company  SAT.
Credit is allowed only for net income  taxes paid to foreign goverrunents. This restriction  is intended to
prevent credit being  taken for gross receipts  taxes, scverance  taxes, royalties,  etc., especially  those levied
by oil-rich nations.  It can be argued  that the SAT is not a tax on net income, because no deduction is
allowed for interest expense.
If the SAT were not creditable, several concerns would arise.  First, the country adopting the
SAT night be giving up the opportunity  to have part of its tax bill paid by the U.S. government.w'
Second, a non-creditable  tax might discourage investments  by U.S. multinational  corporations in RSEs
adopting ti e SAT.
I b, lieve that the SAT should be creditable; of course, this line of reasoning  may not be found
convincing.-'  First, the SAT is less burdensome  than a tax on real net economic income, not more;
this is indicated  by the METRs  under the two taxes: zero under the SAT; statutory  rate under the income
tax.  Moreover, revenues are likely to be lower under the SAT than under an income tax levied at the
same rate.0  Second, the SAT clearly has economic  and administrative  advantages that recommend  it
over the income  tax; it is not just a gross receipts tax being levied to soak up foreign  tax credits. Finally,
fur the portion of the income tax base that is common to the base of the SAT, extraordinary  profits, the
two taxes are identical. In short, the SAT should be creditable.21
lhis issue cm easily be overstated.  First, creditability  is an issue only for repatriated eangs.
For income financed by reinvestment  of retained eanings, the effec  of taxion  resemble those of a
territorial system.2'
Second, a tax with a MEM  of zero, even when combined with the US tax on repatriated
earnings, is unlikely to have much disincentive  effect on investment  in the host country.
Tbird, as a result of the rate reduction and other features in the 1986  tax reform many American
multinationals  have excess foreign tax credits (that is, they have paid more foreign taxes than they can
credit against U.S. liability, because  of statory  limits on the availability  of the U.S. credit).K' Excess
credits can only be carried backward  two years and forward  five years (without  interest). Because  of the
American  use of an overall limitation  on the foreign  tax credit, such companies  would  not be able to take
credit for an income  tax levied by an RSE, even  if the tax were, in principle, creditable. In other words,
there may be little practical difference  between  a creditable  income  tax and a non-creditable  SAT; neither
would actually  be credited.
There is, however, more to the story than this. First, not all American  firms have excess foreip
tax credits.  Second, similar questions must be addressed for other countries employing worldwide
taxation  based on the residence of the taxpayer and offering foreign  tax credits for source-based  income
taxes.
Third, any country knowingly  adopting a non-creditable  tax would be in a vulnerable  position.
If the United States were to raise its corporate income tax rates enough to restore the 'umbrella'  over
the tax systems of other countries, any country adopdng a non-creditable  tax could be placed in a worse
position than if it had adopted  a creditable  tax.
Fourth, the creditability  of the company  tax may have symbolic  importance  over and above the
number of dollars of U.S. tax offset by the foreign tax credit.  In this respect creditability  may resemble
the existence of a double taxation treaty.  There are good reasons to question whether developing
countries  benefit, on balance, from treades concluded  with developed  countries. Much the same question
can be raised about treaties between RSEs and developed Western countries.  Yet the existence of a
system of tax treaties may be thought to be important as providing evidence of a stable investment
environment. Much the same may be said of the symbolic  importance  of creditability.
The hybrid system described  above in the section  on the cost of capital would  eliminate  concerns
about creditability. A tax that allowed  a deduction  for interest  expense  would clearly be creditable. But,
as noted there, such a system is not without  its own problems.
I.  IQ  S
The shift from an income tax to the SAT would pose difficult  transition problems for a Western market
economy.  These involve primarily how to treat the undepreciated basis of assets and interest on
outstanding debt, in order to avoid windfall gains and losses.W This is much less problematical in
economies in transition from socialism.
First, under the system of enterprise taxation  based on "balance  sheet" profits, some interest is
not deductible; in addition, interest rates have tended to be exceptionally  low (e.g., one percent on some
loans in Bulgaria). lTus  shifting to a system in which interest is not deductible  is not a major change.22
In addition,  since  there have been  no deductions  for depreciation,  there is no isssue  of how rapidly  to
allow  the remaining  basis  to be written  off.
Second,  if the SAT could be introduced  quickly,  before privatization,  windfalls  would be
experienced  largely  by state-owned  enterprises,  rather  than  by individuals  and  privately  owned  companies.
Under some  forms of privatization  windfalls  would  also be less  troubling  than in the West, even if
experienced  by private  investors. In particular,  one could  hardly  complain  about  windfalls  if the SAT
were introduced  just after all citizens  received  equal  shawes  in all enterprises  (or vouchers  that entitled
them  to such  shares)  and no private  investment  had yet occurred. Of course,  the longer  introduction  of
the SAT-or any  new  direct  tax system-is  postponed,  the more  the transition  issues  resemble  those  in the
West. The  windfall  problem  could  be alleviated,  though  at the cost  of increased  uncertainty,  by making
it clear  to prospective  buyers  and  investors  that a system  such  as the SAT  is being  considered.
Third, in many  countries  making  the transition  from socialism  the issue is essentially  one of
introducing  a new tax system  where  a workable  system  has not existed, rather than substituting  one
workable  system  for another. (Again,  delay  will render  this assessment  inaccurate,  since  elements  of
Western  style  income  taxes  are  being  introduced.)  Unlike  the  situation  in Western  countries,  maintenance
of the status  quo is not a viable  option;  these countries  must abandon  their present  flawed  systems.
Similar  transition  problems  will  be faced  whether  the  shift  is to the SAT  or to a conventional  income  tax.
T1he  transition  to the SAT  may  be no more  difficult  than  the transition  to a conventional  income  tax.
Ihis is especially  true once  one considers  the need  to deal  adequately  with issues  of timing  and
inflation  adjustment  described  above. At high  rates  of inflation,  most  of nominal  interest  paymenls  would
be disallowed  as deductions  or excluded  from income;  disregarding  all such  payments  may  involve  only
a minor  difference.  Of course,  the administrative  and  compliance  effort  needed  to introduce  a tax on real
economic  income  is far greater  than  that needed  for the SAT.
Finally,  and most  important,  any  transition  problems  resulting  from  the introduction  of the SAT
are likely  to be swamped  by the larger  transition  effects  of moving  from a command  economy,  with  state
ownership,  controlled  prices, etc., to market  economies  with  private  ownership  of property,  market-
determined  prices,  etc. The present  transition  period  offers  unparalleled  freedom  to choose  the  best and
most appropriate  tax system  available,  relatively  unencumbered  by past choices.19
No country  in the West  has wanted  to be the first ta introduce  the SAT.'  (That  international
tax conventions  are based  on the income  tax is a different  issue;  it is discussed  above.) The argument
that  no one  has ever  tried the SAT  is less  telling  in countries  emerging  from  socialism,  since  no country
has ever  tried  to make  the transition  from a command  economy  to free markets,  either.
A slightly  different  reaction  commonly  heard  in the countries  of Central  and  Eastern  Europe  is
that they  do not want to be used as guinea  pigs  for an experiment  Westem  countries  are unwilling  to
undertake  at home. While  this  reaction  is understandable,  it really  does  not  seem  appropriate.  The  thesis
of this paper  is that the SAT  may  be more  appropriate  ,or RSEs  than is a conventional  income  tax, for
the reasons  stated. If the reasoning  presented  here  is not found  compelling,  the SAT  should  be rejected.
in making  this judgement,  one should  clearly  be aware  of the costs of being mistaken. The
primary  risk  seems  to be the up- front  revenue  loss  resulting  from expensing  and  the transition  problems
that would  result from the need to switch  subsequently  to a system  in which interest  is taxable  and23
deductible (and the related problems involved  in changing the tax treatment of dividends). Taxpayers
would not object to allowing deductibility  for interest on existing indebtedness  (or for dividends); the
primary problem would be one of revenue loss.  By comparison,  creditors (shareholders)  would object
to the taxation  of interest income from existing  debt (dividends  on existing  stock).  It would, of course,
be undesirable  to allow interest deductions  without  taxing interest income. Since the marginal  tax rates
of most borrowers  are likely to be higher than those paid by most lenders, it seems likely that borrowers
and lenders could work out voluntary arrangements  to restructure debt incurred under the SAT foir an
income tax world.
K.  Relation  tI the VAI
In his recent book, The Road to a Free Economy,  Janos Kornai (1990, pp. 125-3  1.) argues that
Hungary  (and by implication,  all economies  in transition  from socialism)  should  adopt  three types of taxes
as their primary sources  of public revenue:  a linear consumption  tax such as the value added tax, a linear
(non-progressive)  payroll tax, and a linear (non-progressive)  profit  tax. He urges this approach  to achieve
three objectives: simplicity, economic  neutrality,  and non-progressivity. The SAT clearly resembles  an
amalgam of the last two of these (but it might well be levied at graduated  rates on labor income).  It is
most commonly  thought of as a substitute  for the individual  and company income taxes.
The SAT is also quite similar to the subtraction-method  VAT.  (This is shown in appendix  B.)
But, because  the SAT can accommodate  personal  exemptions  and graduated  rates on income from labor,
it has distributional  advantages  not shared by any extant VAT.  It woud be fairly easy to duplicate  the
basic distributional  effects of the SAT at the low end of the income scale through the combination  of a
VAT and a system of grants based on labor income and the size and composition of families; it is,
however, difficult  to achieve  the full range of rate differentiation  provided by the SAT.  This raises
the question of whether it makes sense for a country to have both a VAT and the SAT.d'  One can
imagine  a system in which the SAT  substitutes  for both the VAT and the individual  and company  income
taxes (and for payroll taxes).
The answer seems to depend in part on whether  the country  in question  has aspirations  of joining
the European Community. If it does, there is no real alternative  to adopting an EC-type VAT; in that
case, the only question  is whether  to adopt  the SAT instead  of a conventional  income  tax.  The discussion
to this point has implicitly  taken this question  as the point of departure.
For a country not likely to be joining the EC anytime soon the question is more complicated.
Administrative  resources would be saved by concentrating  them on one tax.  But this benefit would be
achieved at the risk of putting "all the revenue eggs in one basket," a serious issue in countries that a)
can hardly afford serious revenue shortfalls, b) have little experience in tax administration, and c) can
expect evasion  to be a serious problem. If these fears can be overcome, the SAT would be the logical
choice for the single revenue source, since the SAT is much simpler than the conventional  income  tax,
and the individual component of the tax can be  "personalized"  to  take account of the  individual
circumstances  of taxpayers in a way that the VAT cannot  be.  Moreover, the individual  SAT can include
graduated rates.
There are, however, international  issues  to be addressed  in this discussion. We have seen above
that the SAT may be judged not to be creditable  against  the income  tax of the United  States (and perhaps
those of other countries). Ironically,  it is also possible  that border tax adjustments  (BTAs, compensating
taxes on imports  and rebate of tax on exports) would not be allowed for the SAT, on the grounds that
it is not an indirect tax, the only type for which BTAs are allowed under the General Agreement on24
Tariffs  and Trade. Thus  we would  have  the worst  of both  worlds-no  foreign  tax credit  and no border
tax adjustments.  It seems  likely,  however,  that  the  tax could  be structured  to avoid  one  of these  adverse
judgements.
VII. CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Countries  emerging  from  socialism  must  move  quickly  to implement  tax systems  that  will allow
them to finance  the proper functions of government  in a non-inflationary  manner, Yet, they are ill-
prepared  to cope  with the intricacies  of a standard  income  tax.  They  lack  the accounting  practices,  the
tax administration,  and the experience  with tax compliance  to make an income  tax work well.  It is
important  to design  tax policy  with  these  limitations  in mind,  rather than  simply  i6-Poring  them during
the (possibly  long) period when they remain  significant  impediments.  Indeei, I would  argue that
administrative  considerations  should  weigh  almost  as heavily  as economic  effes  in the choice  of a tax
system  for a country  emerging  from socialism.-W
This paper suggests  an alternative  to the income  tax, the SAT, that encourages  saving  and
invesunent  in a way  that is economically  neutral  and avoids  many  of the administrative  problems  of an
income  tax, especially  those  stemming  from  timing  issues  and  the  need  for inflatio1n  adjustment.  The  SAT
is not a panacea. But  I believe  it deserves  serious  consideration.25
Appendix  A
Relation  of SAT  and Income  Tax 21'
Tables  A-1 and A-2 are constructed  to show  the relationship  of the SAT to the conventional
income  tax.  lhey are based  on the simplifying  assumption  that an investment  of $1,000  In a real asset
that  lasts  exactly  one year is made  at the end  of year 1. To simplify  the example,  we assume  that  there
are no expenditures  other  than  those  for the initial  investment  and (in  Table  A-2)  interest  expense;  The
investment  yields  a 20 percent  return.  Under  these assumptions  expensing  gives  a tax deduction  of
$1,000  in year 1, but economic  depreciation  postpones  the $1,000  deduction  to year  2, when  the asset
is assumed  to become  valueless. In either  event,  gross  receipts  are $1,200  in year 2, representing  the
retn  of principal  of $1,000  and  the before-tax  yield  of 20 percent  or $200.
Table  A-I considers  the ease  of 100  percent  equity  finance.  In the top  half  of the  table  economic
income is the tax base; thus income is caleulated  using economic  depreciation. Income is $200,9  tax is
$60, calculated  using  an assumed  tax rate  of 30 percent,  and  net (after  tax) income  is $140.
The bottom  half  of the table  illustrates  the SAT. In it expensing  of $1,000  produces  a tax saving
of $300  in the first year, so that  the private  investmet of "own"  funds  is only $700.1' Since  there are
no year  2 deductions  for expenses,  tax is 30 percent  of $1.200,  or $360, and  net income  is again  $140
($1,200  - $700 -$360).
It is important  to emphasize  the similarities  and differences  in these  results.  In both cases
the net income is $140.  But in the income tax case the private investment  is $1,000, while in the SAT
case it is only $700, due to the benefits of expensing. Thus the net retu  is only 14 percent (.14 =
140/1,000)  in the income  tax case,  but 20 percent  in the SAT  case  (140  as a percent  of 700)-just  as in
the absence  of taxation. Whereas  the METR  is equal  to the statutory  rate in the income  tax case, it is
zero  in the SAT  case.
It is easy to see why  the SAT  result  occurs. Because  of expensing,  the government  becomes  a
partner in the investment,  sharing  both the cost of the initial investment  and the return (gross of
depreciation).  Note  that  we have  not  specified  the normal  rate  of return. The gvs
and  the MM  iser-no  matr  whethr the.  Droica  er  moare  or less  than a normal  ren.
Table  A-2 considers  the case  of 40 percent  equity  finance  with  debt  carrying  an interest  rate of
20 percent. Under  the income  tax interest  of $120  is  deductible  in the second  year. This  reduces  taxable
income  to $80; income  tax is $24  and  net income  is $56  or 14  percent  of the initial  equity  investment  of
$400. Thus  the effective  rate  of tax on equity  equals  the  statutory  rate  of 30 percent,  as in the all-equity
case.
The result  for the SAT in the case  of debt  finance  is again  a METR  of zero. This can be seen
from the following. Because  of expensing  and  debt-finance,  'own" investment  is only $100  ($1.000  -
$600 debt - $300 tax saving attributable  to expensing).W  After tax income  is $20 ($1,200 gross
receipts - $600 repayment of debt - $360 tax - $120 interest - $100 own investment);  thus  the return to
capital  is 20 percent,  the same  as in the no-tax  situation. (Own  invesunent  of $400  and net income  of
$80).26
Table  A-I
Comparison  of SAT  and  Income  Tax,
100  Percent  Equity  Finance
Investment  Yielding  20 Percent
Tax/transaction  Year 1  Year  2
I  _a_~~~m Income  TIn (with  ewonomig  depreciation)
Gross  receipts  0  1,200
Depreciation  0  1,000
Taxable  Income  0  200
Income  tax (30%)  0  60
After-tax  income  *  140
Own"  investmen  1,000  *
After-tax  retn  on "own"  *  14
fiuilds
Effective  tax rate  on "own"  *  30
fiind
Sinified  Alternadve  (with  xensing)
Gross  receipts  0  1,200
Expensing  1,00  0
Taxable  income  -1,000  1,200
Income  tax (30%)  -30  360
After-tax  income  *  140
"Own"  investnent  700  0
After-tax  return  on "own"  *  20
fiUds
Effiectivetax  rate on "own"  *  0
funds27
Table  A-2
Comparison  of SAT  and  Income  Tax,
40 Percent  Equity  Finance
Investment  Yielding  20 Percent
Tax/transaction  Year 1  Year 2.
Income  Tax (with  ecnomic denrecatjon
Gross  receipts  0  1,200
Depreciation  0  1,000
Interest  expense  0  120
Taxable  Income  0  80
Income  tax (30%)  0  24
After-tax  *  56
"Own"  investment  400
After-tax  return  on "own"  *  14
funds
Effective  tax rate on "own"  *  30
funds
Simplifled  Altemative  Tax (with  expensing)
Gross  receipts  0  1,200
Expensing  1,000  0
Taxable  income  -1,000  1,200
Income  tax (30%)  - 300  360
Interest  expense  S  120
After-tax income  *  20
"Own" investment  100  *
After-tax  return  on "own"  *  20
funds
Effective  tax rate  on "own"  *  0
funds28
Appendix B
Relation of SAT to VATS'
The SAT, which is commonly  considered  to be a substitute  for the income tax, bears a striking
resemblance  to one form of value added  tax.  This is shown  here, in order to provide  background  for the
question addressed in section VII: does it makes sense for a country  to have both a VAT and the SAT?
1.  The basic analysis
Table B-I illustrates  the relationship  of the SAT to two types of value added  tax, the subtraction-
method tax employed in Japan and the credit method tax used in the EC and most other countries that
have VATs.  The first four lines  of the table indicate  the assumptions  on which the example  rests.  It is
assumed that there are three stages in a linear process of production and distribution.  Farmers grow
wheat,  using only hired labor and no purchased  inputs; millers hire labor, buy all the wheat, and convert
it into flour, which is sold only to bakers; the bakers produce bread, which is sold only to households.
To simplify  the comparison, it is assumed  that the three taxes  are all imposed  at a rate of 10 percent; thus
there are no exemptions  or zero rates under the VAT.  Moreover, under the SAT of this example  there
are no personal  exemptions, itemized  deductions,  or graduated  rates.
Value added in each of the three stages can be measured  alternatively  as the difference  between
sales and purchases or the sum of wages  and salaries  and "profits.  Profits is enclosed  in quotation  marks
to indicate that it is calculated  by deducting all purchases, including investments in capital goods and
inventories, as under the SAT and consumption-based  VATs, rather than using depreciation allowances
and inventory  accounting,  as under a standard  income  X.  For the purpose at hand this distinction  is not
important,  since all three taxes under discussien treat capital goods and inventories  in the same way; if
the comparison  were with an income  tax, as in Tables A-1 and A-2, or with an income-based  VAT, the
distinction  would be important.-W  A more important  distinction  for the present purposes  is the treatment
of foreign trade under the three taxes; this is discussed  at the end of this appendix.
The SAT system consists of two taxes, those on individuals and companies.  The base of the
business SAT (the "profits" of lines 4 and 9) is the difference between sales and the sum of purchases
and wages and salaries. The individual  SAT is imposed  only on wages and salaries. The calculation  of
these two taxes is shown in lines 6 to 13.
Th 3 sinilarity of the SAT and the subtraction-method  VAT is immediately obvious from a
comparisor.  of these calculations  with those of lines 14 to 17.  The sum of the base of the two SATs is
identical  to the base of the subtraction-method  VAT. This is inevitable, since the base of the company
SAT differs from that of the subtraction-method  VAT by the amount of wages and salaries-which is the
base of the individual  SAT.  Stating the tax bases algebraicadly:
Total SAT =  Company  SAT + Individual  SAT
Company  SAT =  Sales - Purchases  - Wages  & Salaries
Individual  SAT = Wages  and Salaries
Total SAT = Sales - Purchases =  Subtraction  VAT29
Of course,  the possibility  of personal  exemptions,  itemized  dedm!ctions,  and  graduated  rates  weakens  this
equivalence,  but the fact  remains  that  the SAT  shares  characteristics  of the subtraction-method  VAT.Y'
It is also  useful  to compare  the  SAT  with  the credit-method  VAT  illustrated  in the last  three lines
of Table  B-1. Under  the credit-method  VAT  tax is calculated  by deducting  taxes  paid  on purchases,  as
evidenced  by invoices,  from tax on sales. Provided  there  is only  one tax rate  that is uniformly  applied
to ali transactions,  the credit  and  subtraction  methods  produce  identical  results,  as they  do in the simple
example  of Table  B-i.  In more  realistic  situations  in which  there  are exemptions  and  differential  rates,
the equivalence  is only  approximate,  and there  are good  reasons  for preferring  the credit  method.w
2.  International  aspects
It is important  to consider  now the treatment  of international  trade under the three taxes.W
There are two standard  ways  in which  trade can be treated. Under  the "destination  principle,"  tax is
collected  on imports,  but not  on exports. (Indeed,  taxes  collected  before  the export  stage  are rebated.)
Thus  the  tax is levied  on consumption,  rather  than  on production.  This is the approach  used  by virtually
every  country  that  has a VAT. The alternative  is the "origin  principle." Under  it tax is not rebated  on
exports  and is not collected  on imports. Thus production  is taxed, rather than consumption.  This
approach  is not  popular,  because  it appears  to place  a nation's  producers  at a disadvantage,  relative  to
imports and in export  markets.)'
Whereas  it is commonly  taken  for granted  that  credit-method  VATs  are based  on the destination
principle,  it seems  more likely  that the SAT  would,  in effect,  be an origin-based  tax (if thought  of in
indirect  tax  terms). That  is, as under  an income  tax, receipts  from  exports  would  presumably  be included
in gross  'income"  for tax purposes  and a deduction  would  be given  for purchases  of imports,  as well  as
for those  of domestically  produced  goods. In this important  sense  the SAT  and the VAT,  as ordinarily
implemented,  would  be quite  different. (Since  Japan's is the only example  of an extant  subtraction-
method  VAT,  this  comparison  is limited  to the  credit-method  VAT. In principle,  a uniform  subtraction-
method  VAT  levied  at a single  rate  could  be imposed  on either  the origin or destination  basis. Note,
however,  that  it is very difficult  to use the subtraction  method  to implement  the destination  principle  if
a single  rate is not  applied  to all consumption)A°")
This  raises  the interesting  question  of whether  the SAT  could  be levied  under  destination-principle
rules-a policy  some  would  favor  because  of the  apparent  benefits  to domestic  producers. That  is, could
exports  be omitted  from the tax base and could  a deduction  for imports  be disallowed? Under the
General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade (GATI) border tax adjustments  (BTAs-export  rebates  and
compensating  import  taxes)  are allowed  for indirect  taxes  such  as the VAT,  but not  for direct  taxes  such
as the income  tax.  The question  is: which  type  of tax is the SAT7
The answer  is far from clear,  in part because  the definitions  of direct  and indirect  taxes  are not
clear. As described  thus  far in this appendix  the SAT  appears  to be equivalent  to the subtraction-based
VAT. But  there is some  question  whether  the GATI would  treat the SAT  as an indirect  tax, despite  its
similarity  to the credit-method  VAT. 1'9  Once  one adds  personalization  and graduated  rates, the SAT
looks  more like an income  tax and less  like  one for which  BTAs  should  be allowed. But it would  be
fairly  easy  to duplicate  the SAT  through  the combination  of a credit-method  VAT  and  a system  of grants
based  on labor income  and the size and composition  of families.A'0  This, plus the rough  equivalence
of the origin and destination  principles,  reemphasizes  the question  raised at the beginning  of this
discussion:  does it make  sense  to have  both  the SAT  and a VAT?30
Table B-1
Relation  of the SAT to Two Types of VAT
~~~~~~~~~Bi  Icagoi
Farmer  Miller  Baker  Total
1.  Sales  300  700  1,000  2,000
2.  Purchases  0  300  700  1,000
3.  Wages and salaries  200  200  200  600
4.  "Profits"  100  200  100  400
5.  Value added  300  400  300  1,000
Simplifid Alrative  TIn
Business  SAT
6.  Sales  300  700  1,000  2,000
7.  Purchases  0  300  700  1,000
8.  Wages andProfits  200  200  200  600
9.  "Profits"  100  200  100  400
10.  Business  SAT  10  20  10  40
Individual SAT
il.  Wages and salaries  200  200  200  600
12.  Individual  SAT  20  20  20  60
13.  Total SAT  30  40  30  100
:ViATMob  YAI
14.  Sales  300  700  1,000  2,000
15.  Purchases  0  300  700  1,000
16.  Value added  300  400  300  1,000
17.  Tax  30  40  30  100
Credit-method  VAT
18.  Tax on sales  30  70  100  200
19.  Tax on purchases  0  30  70  100
20.  VAT  liability  30  40  3031
Appendix  C
Advantages  of the SAT  Over  the
Tax on Consumed  Income
Under  certain  circumstances  the SAT  is equivalent  to a tax on labor  income  and  economic  rents
and quasi-rents.'w In present  value terms  such a tax is also equivalent  to a tax on consumption.W
The SAT  is one  of two consumption-based  direct  taxes  that  have  been  widely  discussed  in recent  years,
the R-based  tax of the Meade  Commission.A' Both taxes allow immediate  expensing  for capital
investments,  including  purchases  of inventories. The other, the R plus F-based  tax of the Meade
Commission,  includes  borrowing,  as well  as interest  income,  in the tax base  and allows  a deductlon  for
lending  and repayment  of debt, as well as for interest  expense. The base of such a tax is clearly
consumption  or "consumed  income."  The SAT  is much  simpler  to administer  than  the R plus  F tax and
is  the only one considered  here.  This appendix  presents only two examples of this greater
simplicityPl7
Under  the SAT  neither  debt  transactions  (principal)  nor interest  has any tax consequences.  By
comparison,  under  the R plus F-based  tax both  principal  and interest  do have  tax consequences.  This
means that withholding  would  be much more complicated  under the latter tax.  Not only would
withholding  be required  for borrowing  (with  "reverse  withholding"  for lending  and repayment  of debt);
borrowing  for consumption  purposes  would  affect  tax liability,  making  accurate  withholding  more
difficult.
Opportunities  for abuse  would  be greater  under  the R plus F-based  tax than  under  the SAT. A
particularly  worrisome  form  of abuse  would  occur  during  transition  to the former  type  of tax. Taxpayers
who  took  funds  out of the country-including  funds  borrowed  for the purpose-could  channel  them  back
to give  the appearance  of increases  in savings.32
ENDNOTES
1.  On this problem, see McKinnon  (1990) and Feige (1990).
2.  For further discussion, see Holzman (1954), Wanless (1985), Gray (1990) and McLure (in
process, a).
3.  Gray (1991) gives a brief description  of the situation in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia,  and
the USSR.  McLure (1991, b) does the same for Bulgaria.
4.  In private correspondence  Richard  Bird has noted the irony of this. In market economies  the lack
of control over state enterprises  creates problems.  But the privatization  of such enterprises in
RSEs threatens to create budgetary  problems, because of lack of fiscal control.
5.  For the suggestion that itinerant  tax advisers have frequently sold LDCs tax policies that were
inappropriate  to their circumstances,  see McLure and Pardo (1991).
6.  On the worldwide tax reform movement, see the papers in Gillis (1989), Boskin and McLure
(1990),  and  Shirazi and  Shah (forthcoming).  Perhaps  it should be  noted that what I  call the
"Swiss  cheese' model  of taxation  in (McLure, 1991, b) was not adopted  in response  to the advice
of responsible foreign advisors; it reflects home-grown interventionist  attitudes, presumably
created and  nurtured by  decades of  central planning.  Responsible foreign advisers are
recommending  against the use of such gimmicks.
7.  As noted in section  V, the SAT is equivalent  to exemption  of the rettvm  to investmnent.  In present
value h  is equivalent  to a tax on consumption  under certain circumstances. See McLure  ".,
(1990) chapter 8.  The SAT belongs to  a  family of direct taxes usually characterized as
consumption  taxes.  It should be emphasized  that the SAT is gM  the expenditure  tax briefly and
unsuccessfully  introduced  by India and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) some thirty years ago.  Though
the SAT shares certain important characteristics  of that tax, it differs in ways that simplify
administration. See McLure  g.u.,  (1990), Zodrow and McLure (1988), or McLure  and Zodrow
(1990), as well as the appendix  to the present paper.
8.  These are discussed more fully in McLure  (1991, a) and (1991, b).
9.  East Germany  is omitted  from this list because  of reunification  with West Germany. It now looks
that Albania may soon be added to the list.  Concentration  on RSEs in Central and Eastern
Europe reflects the author's primary interest in that area; most of what is said would be equally
app icable in other geographic  areas.
10.  Of course, the problems may be significantly  different if one is writing about policy for one of
the republics, instead of policy for the union; see McLure (in process, c)
11.  On the need for stability in the investment  climate, see McLure (1991, a), which draws heavily
on Litwack (1989).
12.  Janos Kornai has suggested  this classifilcation  in correspondence  with the author.13.  On soft budget constraints and their implications, see Kornai (1979).  In most RSEs much of
enterprise tax revenues go to pay subsidies  to enterprises  that suffer losses.  In some cases the
payment  of taxes may have simply  increased  losses  and bank credit to enterprises;  thus enterprise
borrowing from banks may have substituted  for government borrowing as a source of money
creation and inflationary  pressure.  The distinction  between taxes and profits has traditionally
made little difference in this sector, since  both accrue to the state.  This is, of course, precisely
one of the reasons that managers  of state enterprises  have little incentive to maximize profits.
Prescriptions  for using tax policy in the attempt to harden the budget constaint are beyond the
scope of this paper.
14.  Indeed, in the Soviet  Union, there are effectively  two moneys, what households  receive  as wages
and use to make their purchases  and that used within  the enterprise sector. The latter cannot be
converted into to the former, except with the permission  of the planners. See McKinnon  (1990)
or (1991).
15.  This evocative  term comes from Radian (1979), chapter 6.
16.  For a discussion  of this case, see Gray (1991).  It may be worth noting that there is no atempt
to assign tax instruments uniquely to  various forms of  socialism.  Thus centrally planned
economies  have long relied on both profits taxes and turnover taxes, as well as confiscation  of
profits.
17.  I am indebted to John Litwackc  for this observation, which he made in personal conversation.
18.  Atkinson  and Micklewright  (1991)  report distributions  of labor income in some RSEs that appear
to be no more equal than those in some Western countries.
19.  For the view that such pressures should  be resisted, see Kornai (1990), pp. 122-25.
20.  "Spontaneous  privatization"  (the euphemism  applied to the abusive "roll-your-own"  privatization
in which members of the nomenclatura,  in essence, sell or otherwise  appropriate  to themselves
state enterprises  or their assets  at bargain  prices) would  produce  a much  more concentrated  initial
ownership  of companies  and of wealth in general than would distribution  of shares or vouchers
to all citizens.
21.  This is true, even though the VAT used in the EC is not necessarily  the best model.  The New
Zealand VAT is superior.
22.  See Hartman (1981).
23.  These developments  are explained  more fully in McLure  (1990, b) and Slemrod (1991).
24.  As noted in section V, the income tax also distorts the saving-consumption  choice.  That is an
inevitable feature of the income tax, and not a distortion that results because of problems
administering  the tax.
25.  This discussion  draws on McLure (1988) and (1989a).34
26.  It is useful to separate losses in value that result from a decline in productivity  from those that
result from a decline in the price of the output the assets produce.  Both are relevant for
measuring  economic income.  But whereas the former is best seen as a matter of depreciation,
the latter are more appropriately  classified  as capital losses.
27.  This peculiar assumption  is made for expositional  convenience. It avoids the scrapping  of the
asset at the end of year 2, without complicating  the calculation  of present values of allowances
taken at various times.
28.  In the United States gains on assets transferred at death are never taxed.  In the case of assets
transferred through gifts, the recipient  assumes the donor's basis in the asset.  The first of these
increases  lock-in of assets held by aged and infirm taxpayers, but reduces it immediately  after
death.  The second simply increases  lock-in.
29.  Unforeseen  fluctuations  in interest rates may, of course, create additional  gains and losses.
30.  Actually even this extreme approach is not the conceptually  ideal solution.  Strictly speaking,
expenses  should be deducted  currently, but increases  in wealth represented by increased earning
power should be included in income for tax purposes. This is even more problematical.
31.  Inequity is apparent, and not real, if capital is sufficiently  mobile that all investments  eam the
same after-tax yield and differences in tax treatment are merely reflected in distortions.  In
general there is likely to be enough inertia in the system that tax shelters create real inequities
as well as the perception  of inequity. On perceptions  of inequity, see also note 73 below.
_  - --- r-  more on "backstop"  provisions, see McLure (1990a).
33.:  See Arthur Andersen (1986), p. 4.
34.  It may be desirable to note explicitly at this point that this discussion involves only inflation
adjustment  in the measurement  of income from business  and capital. It ignores the separate and
much  simpler question  of indexation  of amounts  specified  in nominal  (monetary) terms in the tax
law, including  personal exemptions,  rate brackets, etc.  See also Aaron (1976). Of course, the
latter type of indexation  should be provided.
35.  This distinction  is discussed  further in McLure gLn. (1990), chapter 7.  The use of LIFO as a
surrogate  for indexed FIFO is analogous  to basing depieciation  allowances  on replacement  costs
(rather than on indexed  acquisition  costs)-a practice  that, like many  other surrogates adopted  for
practical reasons, is also conceptually  improper.
36.  This version of  "Fisher's law," unmodified to  take account of taxation, is considered for
simplicity. Modification  would not change  the nature of the argument.
37.  Colombia took this approach in  its  1986 reforms.  The U.S.  Treasury Department (1984)
proposed an even less satisfactory  system in which a fixed real rate of interest was assumed.
38.  See McLure gW.  (1990), chapter 7, for a complete  description of this technique.35
39.  Historically  price indices  have often had little meaning in socialist countries, since many of the
items in the consumer's market basket could not be bought at the prices set by the state.  As
prices are liberalized, the problems  will be more statistical.
40.  See Lipton and Sachs (1991), p. 114.
41.  Mintz (1990) writes in a similar vein, "the income tax is inherently  imperfect and complex."
42.  See McLure (1979).  Strictly speaking, under the so-called "new view" of the taxation of
dividends,  this argument  applies  only to equity finance  via new issues  of shares. This is the most
relevant case in the context of RSEs, especially if the basic tax system is established before
privatization  occurs.
43.  If the tax rate applied to the ordinary income  of individuals  is higher  than the corporate  rate, but
that applied to capital gains is lower, the corporate form may be tax-preferred  for activities  giving
rise to capital gains, but not for those paying out earnings currently.
44.  In 1986  Colombia  adopted  an approach  that, while not conceptually  sound, seems appropriate  for
its situation, given the concentration  of share ownership  in the hands of the wealthy:  it simply
exempts  dividends  from shareholder  taxation. Depending  on how privatization  is achieved, the
extreme  concentration  of share ownership may not occur in RSEs. See also McLure (1991, b).
45.  See McLure (1979), chapter 4.  In Colombia, where the corporate tax rate is 30 percent, this is
handled in a fairly simple way; dividends  are exempt only to the extent they do not exceed 7/3
of corporate taxes paid.  Corporations  make this calculation  and inform recipients  of dividends
whether dividends  are taxable  or exempt.
46.  This section  draws on earlier work  with George Zodrow  reported in Zodrow and McLure  (1988);
McLure  ".,  (1990); and McLure  and Zodrow (1990). See also appendix  B.
47.  This differs from the situation  under the so-called expenditure  tax (the R + F base of the Meade
Commission),  under which both the proceeds  of borrowing and interest income are included in
the tax base, and both repayment  of debt and interest expense  are deductible.
48.  Thus individuals buying or selling non-financial  assets would need to file business returns.  In
simple cases these could be additional schedules filed with the individual  tax, as under many
income taxes.
49.  See McLure (1991, b).
50.  By forgoing salaries, owners  of businesses  could, however, pass losses through  to themselves  to
the extent of the salaries they would otherwise  receive.
51.  McIntyre (1983) suggests that  homeowners might transfer their  homes to  wholly-owned
corporations which would charge their owners below-market  rents  and use deductions for
expenses to offset income from other sources.  This scheme does not seem to  be a major
problem, since only homeowners  with business  income  could  benefit from it. It would  be simpler
to monitor rental rates set in these relatively few cases than to monitor imputed rents for all
homeowners.36
52.  If the rate of inflation  during the taxable  period is extremely  high it may be desirable  to inflation
adjust nominal  amounts  of transactions  occurring  within a given year to make them comparable;
this possibility  is ignored. In addition, the payment  of interest on losses  that are carried forward
is more problematical if the inflation  rate, and thus the interest rate, is high and variaable.
53.  This is identical to the situation under a consumption-based  value-added  tax levied using the
subtraction-method. The similarity  of the SAT to such a VAT is discussed  further in Appendix
B.
54.  Like the dividend-paid  deduction  under the income tax (and unlike the shareholder credit), the
SAT achieves symmetry  in the tax treatment of debt and equity.
55.  Under some proposals gifts and inheritances  would be included in the tax base of individuals;  see
McLure "L.  (1990), chapters 8 and 9.  This would probably  affect the accuracy  of withholding
for only a minute fraction of the population.
56.  In some RSEs the lack of a mortgage deduction  could be seen as a mixed blessing in the short
run, when new construction  and privatization  of existing  houses  should  be encouraged. Of course
there are far better techniques  than mortgage  deductions  for encouraging  hone  ownership.
57.  Thus there is no suggestion  that the tax return could be placed on a postcard, as there is for a
similar proposal in Hall and Rabushka (1983) and (1985).  Thus many of the strong criticisms
of the Hall-Rabushka scheme in McIntyre (1983) would be  inapplicable.  Some anti-abuse
provisions  would be necessary,  but not as many  as fbund in (or desirable)  in many income  taxes.
58.  Mintz and Seade (1939) note, "the main avaenues  for evasison would probably not be affected
at all, for in principle  the informational  needs and resources of the tax authority remain basically
unchanged." Indeed, they note, the cash flow tax is less conducive than the income tax to the
use of presumptive  methods  to determine  tax liability. The same point has been made in McLure
-.  (1990).
59.  In essence, interest is taxed via non-deductibility  and dividends are treated equivalently, instead
of being subject to double taxation, as under the classical system, or asymmetrically,  as under
the imputation  approach  to integration. In the case of interest on bank accounts (and interest paid
by other financial intermediaries),  this effect  of non-deductibility  occurs when the borrower from
the bank is allowed no deduction  for interest expense.
60.  Se  also Appendix A for further development  of this theme.
61.  It i lay be worth noting that "taxable income" is placed in quotation marks to indicate that,
because expensing replaces depreciation, tax is being paid on the return of principal.  By
comparison, after-tax income  of $140 is being calculated  relative to the initial $700 investment
of own funds.
62.  The METR is the percentage  by which taxation  reduces the before-tax rate of return.  See King
and Fullerton (1984) or McLure e.tj_. (1990), chapter 4.
63.  Most tax holidays are available  only in selected  sectors and only for limited periods.  Perpetual
holidays are examined to  increase comparability with the SAT.  Generalized holidays are
examined  to avoid the problems  of targeted holidays.37
64.  An alternative  would  be for the government  to retain  an ownership  share  in companies  being
privatized  and  to require  a share  in new  ventures,  either  with  or without  purchase.  Such  schemes
can be married  with the SAT;  see McLure  (in  process,  c).
65.  This  paragraph draws on McLure  (1991c).
66.  Any  desired  degree  of overall  progressivity  can be achieved  by adjusting  the rate  structure. Of
course, a more highly graduated  rate structure  would  produce disincendves  that could be
damaging  to economic  development.  Moreover,  graduated  rates  in the SAT  are not as effective
as those in the income  tax in dealing  with concentration  in the distribution  of income  from
capital,  given  that  the MEIR is zero  under  the SAT.
67.  The  problem  could  be reduced  in either  case  by the existence  of taxes  on net  wealth  and gift  and
inheritance  taxes. This issue  is not  pursued  firther, since  it is somewhat  distinct  from  the basic
question  of the suitability  of the SAT  for RSEs. It should,  however,  be noted  that  it is extremely
diffiMult  to have a net wealth  tax with a base  that  extends  far beyond  real estate. The proposal
in McLure  fjj.  (1990,  chapter  9) for a Colombidn  SAT  was accompanied  by the suggestions
that  gifts and inheritances  be included  in the tax base of recipients  and that the net wealth  tax
should  be retained. In fact, the tax was  repealed  as rart of Colomba's  1988  tax changes.
Atkinson  and Micklewright  (1991)  surveys  information  on the distribution  of income  in Eastern
Europe,  finding  substanial  differences  across  countries  and  through  time.
68.  Sion  (1987),  p. 349, offers  the following  pessimistic  observaion:  "The  decisive  weakness  of the
proposals  is the missing  ability  to include  the taxation  of personal  interest  income.... A reform
that leaves the rentier's return untaxed  cannot be made palatable  to  any of the world's
parliaments.'
69.  See  Kay  (1988)  and  references  therein.
70.  IThe  consumed  income  tax  is what  the  Meade  Commission  (Institute  for Fiscal  Studies,  1978)  calls
the R plus-F  tax.  It is described  briefly  in Appendix  C.  For further  discussion  of the debate
over "outcomes"  versus  "opportunities,"  see McLure  Su.  (1990),  chapter  9.
71.  The tax benefit  of expensing  is never  recaptured  as long as gross  investment  does not fall; of
course,  some  tax would  generally  be collected  in such  a case. But  McLure  (forthcoming)  notes
that  if the rate  of growth  of investment  is at least  as great  as the rate  of return  on investment,  an
equity-financed  firm  will never  incur  tax liability. Similar  propositions  can be derived  for less
extreme  forms  of accelerated  depreciation.  This phenomenon  helps  explain  the decision  of the
United  Kingdom  to return  from expensing  to depreciation  allowances.  Note,  however,  that  the
U.K. system  did not  combine  expensing  with  disallowance  of interest  deductions.
72.  In private  correspondence  Richard  Bird  has questioned  the desirability  of making  the  government
an implicit  partner  in all investments.  This concern  seems  misplaced,  since  a) private  investors
must risk their own money  in order to risk  the government's  and b) the tax does not actually
encourage  risk-taking;  it is neutral  with  regard  to risk-taking.
73.  In 1981  the United  States  achieved  essentially  the same  effect  for many  firms, without  paying
explicit  refunds, through  "safe-harboi  leasing,"  which  allowed  firms with no tax liability  to
transfer  excess  tax benefits  to firms  that  could  use them, through  the use of transactions  thinly
disguised  as leases. This  approach  proved  to be politically  unacceptable,  and was soon repealed,38
becaue  many profitable firms were able to use the transferred benefits to pay no tax.  Such a
scheme might  not be a long-run  substitute  for refunds, since tax losses might  be so pervasive  that
there would not be enough tax liabilities  to absorb the full benefits of the SAT.
74.  See Tait (1988), pp. 307-8.
75.  Kornai (1979).
76.  Bulgaria, for example, has imposed  a 5 percent tax on the Fund for Development  and Technical
Renovation, one  component of  which is accumulated depreciation.  See  Gray (1991) for
experience  in other RSEs.
77.  Sinn (1987), chapter 11, has advocated such a tax.  McLure (1991, b) offers such a hybrid
between  the SAT and the income  tax as a fall-back  position  if the SAT is rejected. The fact that
investors residing in  countries that provide foreign tax credits might not  benefit from the
exemption  of interest is discussed  further below under "International  Issues."
78.  These issues  are discussed  fiurther  in Zodrow and McLure (1988), Sunley (1988), McLure  KA.
(1990), chapter 9, and McLure and Zodrow (1990).
79.  In principle, this argument is equally applicable to other countries imposing income taxes on
worldwide  income and offering  foreign tax credits. But the United States  has the most stringent
restrictions  on creditability. Mcbityre  (1990)  has argued  that consumption-based  taxes would not
be  creditable and should not be.  Though McIntyre deals prmarily  with what the Meade
commission  called the R plus F type consumption-based  tax (see Institute for Fiscal Studies,
1978),  his arguments  appear to be largely applicable  to the SAT. For similar views, see Sunley
(1988) and Kay (1988).
80.  One person who commented  on a previous draft of this paper found this sentence to express "a
very American attitude." In my view, it is simply an objective statement  of fact.
81.  See McLure  (1990, b).  It is worthwhile  to note that the case for creditability  should be presented
very carefully  to the US Treasury Department,  since a carelessly  prepared argument  might result
in an adverse decision that would doom the SAT to join the ranks of non-creditable  taxes.
82.  Mintz (1990) notes that the tax base for the SAT is narrower than that for the income tax.  lhis
is not necessarily true, if the comparison is with an income tax shot full of holes via holidays,
investmnent  incentives, etc.
83.  See Hartman (1985).
84.  In effect, the United States allows credit only to the extent foreign taxes do not exceed the
amount implied by application  of the average U.S. tax rate of the company to foreign-source
income.
Under the "overall limitation"  on the credit, the income and taxes of all foreign countries (but
not all types of income and taxes thereon) are lumped together in calculating  the limitation.
Another  important  change  in the 1986  legislation  was  to extend  the system  of "baskets" of income
(and related taxes) that could not be combined  for the purpose of calculating  the overall credit.
This also increased  the likelihood  that any company  might be in an excess credit position, as far
as its ordinary business  income is concerned. For a thorough discussion, see Slemrod  (1991).39
Goodspeed  and Frisch (1989)  estimate  that the fraction  of foreign-source  income  subject  to excess
credits would increase from 50  percent to  78  percent (from 32 percent to  82 percent in
manufactring)  as a result of the changes in U.S. tax rates.  These estimate  do not consider
changes in the source allocation  rules or the rules for segregating  income in different "baskets,"
which shouWd  raise these fractions, or the offsetting  effects of reductions  in the tax rates of other
countries or the behavioral  response  of multinational  corporations.
85.  For discussions  of such issues, see Aaron and Galper (1985) and McLure  gul.  (1990), chapter
9.
86.  Slim  (1987), pp. 34849, notes about  proposals  for consumption-based  taxes, "There is only one
problem, though: the taxes involve quite radical reforms of the present tax system and they
cannot be implemented  without a great upheaval....  These aspects are a very long way from
existing  tax laws, and unfortunately,  it seems that they reduce the chances  of the cash flow taxes
being implemented  in the foreseeable  future."
87.  See McLure _e1. (1990), chapter 11 for a discussion  of the Colombian  decision  not to adopt  the
SAT.
88.  See Bradford (1987).
89.  McLure (1989b) considers the analogous  question  for the United States.
90.  Of course, these two features of  tax systems are  not really separable; the way a  tax  is
administered  conditions  its economic  effects.
91.  For a somewhat  different  exposition,  see McLure  (forthcoming)  or McLure .Lai.  (1990), chapter
9.
92.  It is assumed that this deduction  can be utilized immediately. See also the discussion of losses
in the text.
93.  See Musgrave (1990), pp. 473-75.
94.  Exposition become more complicated  if the interest rate differs from the assumed yield to the
investment. If the sum of the marginal  tax rate and the debt-finance  percentage exceeds 100,
"own" funds become negative  and interpretation  of results becomes  difficult.  Consideration  of
such complications  goes beyond  the purpose of this paper.
95.  This discussion  draws on McLure (1989b).  Many of the same points are covered in Bradford
(1987).
96.  To illustrate an income tax or an incoue-b-ased  VAT, it would be necessary to decompose  the
"purchases" line to distinguish  depreciable capital goods, purchases for inventory, and items
consumed currently, and to include additional basic assumptions  on the speed and pattern of
depreciation and on movement  of inventories  and inventory accounting  practices.  In addition,
it would be  necessary to  provide deductions for interest expense. See McLure (1987) for
numerical illustrations  of income-based  VATs.  Though such taxes exist, they are quite rare.97.  Thus U.S. Department  of the Treasury  (1984),  volume  3 refers  to the SAT as a "personal
exemption  VAT."
98.  This  is explained  in greater  detail  in McLure  (1987). It might  be noted  that  the three  taxes  under
consideration  are also equivalent  to a 10 percent  retail  sales tax (RST)levied  only on sales of
bread  to households.  TMis  is not  emphasized  further,  given  the likelihood  that the RST  is not a
relevant  choice  in most  RSEs.
99.  These  issues  are discussed  further  in McLure  (1987).
100.  In long-run  equilibrium  the  origin  and  destination  principles  should  theoretically  have  roughly  the
same real effects,  with only the exchange  rate depending  on which  is chosen. See McLure
(1987). For important  qualifications  to this argument,  see  Cnossen  (1983),  p. 155.
iOl.  For more  on this, see McLure  (1987).
102.  Experience  with the new  Japanese  tax may  shed  some  light  on this issue.
103.  See  Carlson  and McLure  (1984)  and Bradford  (1986).
104.  "Economic  rents"  is a term  economists  use for income  that  exceeds  what  would  be needed  to call
forth a given  economic  activity. Thus it can exist  in areas  other an real estate. In particular,
it includes  extraordinary  profits.
105.  This equivalence  is demonstrated  in McLure  fa-.,  (1990).
106.  See U.S. Department  of the Treasury  (1977);  Lnstitute  for Fiscal  Studies-the  Meade  Report-
(1978);  Hall  and  Rabushka  (1983)  and  (1985);  Bradford  (1986);  McLure  (1988);  and  McLure  gl
al.,  (1990), chapter 9.  Institute  for Fiscal Studies (1978) also discusses  a third type of
consumption-based  direct  tax, which  it calls  the S-base  tax.  Its base is equal  to net flows  from
the business  sector  to the  household  sector, or (in the case  of corporate  business)  the difference
between  dividends  and  net new  issues  of shares. It has received  relatively  little  attention  and is
not  discussed  here.
107.  For more  comprehensive  and  detailed  discussions,  see Zodrow  and McLure  (1988);  McLure  It
l., (1990); or  McLure and Zodrow (1990).  Sunley (1988) argues that there are more
opportunities  for abuse  under  the R-base  tax that  under  the R + F-base  tax.  He mentions,  for
eyample,  difficulties  in differentiating  between  financial  and non-financial  transactions  and the
use of defaults  on loans  to make  disguised  payments  of labor  income. Musgrave  (1990),  on the
odlitr  hand, supports  the view that once taxation  of international  capital  flows  are taken into
acx,unt, the R-based  tax is administratively  superior.41
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